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Abstract
The price of anarchy, originally introduced to quantify the inefficiency of selfish behavior in
routing games, is extended to mean field games. The price of anarchy is defined as the ratio of
a worst case social cost computed for a mean field game equilibrium to the optimal social cost
as computed by a central planner. We illustrate properties of such a price of anarchy on linear
quadratic extended mean field games, for which explicit computations are possible. A sufficient
and necessary condition to have no price of anarchy is presented. Various asymptotic behaviors
of the price of anarchy are proved for limiting behaviors of the coefficients in the model and
numerics are presented.
1 Introduction
The concept of the ‘price of anarchy’ was introduced to quantify the inefficiency of selfish behavior
in finite player games [9][10][13][16][17][18]. In this report, we extend the notion of price of anarchy
to mean field games (MFG). Mean field games were introduced by Lasry and Lions [14] and Caines
and his collaborators [12] to describe the limiting regime of large symmetric games when the number
of players, N , tends to infinity. A mean field game equilibrium characterizes the analogue of a Nash
equilibrium in the N = ∞ regime. Thus, as in the finite player case, it is possible that the mean
field game equilibrium is inefficient. In fact, in the paper of Balandat and Tomlin [2], they present
a numerical example that shows that mean field game equilibria are not efficient, in general. The
suboptimality of a mean field game equilibrium is also illustrated numerically for a congestion
model in a paper of Achdou and Laurie`re [1]. More recently Cardaliaguet and Rainer gave in [5]
a partial differential equation based thorough analysis of the (in)efficiency of the mean field game
equilibria.
In this report, the goal is to define the price of anarchy in the context of mean field games,
and to compute it for a class of linear quadratic mean field game models, which can be solved
explicitly. In fact, we consider an even more general class of games by allowing for interaction
between the players through their controls, in addition to interaction through their states. This
is often referred in the literature as extended mean field game, or mean field game of control. We
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compare the social cost of a mean field game equilibrium to the cost incurred when the players
execute a strategy computed centrally.
We consider a system of N players whose private states are denoted at time t by X1t , X
2
t , · · · ,
XNt . To keep the presentations simple, we assume the state space is R. We denote by µ
N
t the
empirical distribution of the states, namely:
µNt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δXit .
We assume that these states evolve in continuous time under the influences of controls α1t , α
2
t , · · · ,
αNt ∈ A, where the set of admissible controls, A, will be defined later. Let νNt denote the empirical
measure of the controls:
νNt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δαit .
We also assume that if and when interactions between these states and controls are present, they
are of a mean field type, i.e. through µNt and ν
N
t . The time evolution of the state for player i is
given by the Itoˆ dynamics:
dXit = b(t,X
i
t , µ
N
t , α
i
t, ν
N
t )dt+ σdWt.
We work over the interval [0, T ] limited by a finite time horizon T ∈ R+. We assume the drift
function b : [0, T ] × R × P(R) × A × P(A) ∋ (t, x, µ, α, ν) → R is Lipschitz in each of it’s inputs.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the volatility, σ, is a positive constant.
Cost Functionals
We assume that we are given two functions f : [0, T ] × R× P(R) × A× P(A) ∋ (t, x, µ, α, ν) → R
and g : R×P(R) ∋ (x, µ)→ R which we call running and terminal cost functions, respectively. We
assume f and g are Lipschitz in each of their arguments. The goal of player i is to minimize their
expected cost as given by:
J i(α1, · · · ,αN ) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xit , µ
N
t , α
i
t, ν
N
t ) dt+ g(X
i
T , µ
N
T )
]
.
Social Cost
We restrict ourselves to Markovian control strategies α = (αt)0≤t≤T given by feedback functions in
the form αt = φ(t,Xt) and we let A denote the set of such controls. If the N players use distributed
Markovian control strategies of the form αit = φ(t,X
i
t ), we define the cost (per player) to the system
as the quantity J
(N)
φ :
J
(N)
φ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
J i(α1, · · · ,αN ).
We shall compute this social cost in the limit N → ∞ when all the players use the distributed
control strategies given by the same feedback function φ identified by solving an optimization
2
problem in the limit N →∞. We take the social cost to be the limit as N →∞ of J (N)φ , namely:
lim
N→∞
J
(N)
φ = limN→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
J i(α1, · · · ,αN )
= lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xit , µ
N
t , φ(t,X
i
t ), ν
N
t ) dt+ g(X
i
T , µ
N
T )
]
,
= lim
N→∞
E
[ ∫ T
0
< f(t, · , µNXt , φ(t, · ), νNt ), µNt > dt+ < g( · , µNXT ), µNT >
]
,
if we use the notation < ϕ, ρ > for the integral
∫
ϕ(z)ρ(dz) of the function ϕ with respect to the
measure ρ. Now if we assume that in the limit N → ∞ the empirical distributions µNt converge
toward a measure µt, and thus ν
N
t =
1
N
∑N
i=1 δφ(t,Xit ) also converges toward a measure νt, then the
social cost of the feedback function φ becomes:
SC(φ) =
∫ T
0
< f(t, · , µt, φ(t, · ), νt), µt > dt + < g( · , µT ), µT >,
with the expectation, E, disappearing when the limiting flows µ = (µt)0≤t≤T and ν = (νt)0≤t≤T
are deterministic.
We would like to evaluate SC(φ) in the N = ∞ regime directly, without having to construct
the deterministic measure flows µ and ν as limits of the finite player empirical measures. To
do this, we assume that propagation of chaos holds and that the states of the N players become
asymptotically independent in the limit as N →∞. We consider a representative agent whose state
is given by Xφ = (Xφt )0≤t≤T , the continuous time solution of the stochastic differential equation
of McKean-Vlasov type:
dXφt = b(t,X
φ
t ,L(Xφt ), φ(t,Xφt ),L(φ(t,Xφt ))dt+ σdWt (1)
controlled by φ. Then we can identify µ as the law of a representative agent using the feedback
function φ, i.e. µt = L(Xφt ), and similarly, we can identify ν as the law of the control, such that
νt = L(φ(t,Xφt )). Thus, in the N =∞ regime, we rewrite the social cost as:
SC(φ) =
∫ T
0
< f(t, · ,L(Xφt ), φ(t, · ),L(φ(t,Xφt ))),L(Xφt ) > dt+ < g( · ,L(XφT )),L(XφT ) >,
where Xφ satisfies equation (1). For the remainder of the paper, we work in the N = ∞ regime.
As mentioned earlier, φ should be identified by solving an optimal control problem. We consider
two distinct problems:
• φ is a feedback function providing a mean field game equilibrium. We detail more precisely
what is meant by φ providing a mean field game equilibrium in section 1.1.
• φ is the feedback function minimizing the social cost SC(φ), without having to be a mean field
game equilibrium, in which case we use the notation SCMKV for SC(φ). This is a control
problem of McKean-Vlasov type, which is detailed more precisely in section 1.2.
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The two problems are detailed more precisely in sections 1.1 and 1.2. In section 1.3, we define the
price of anarchy based on these two problem formulations. The class of linear quadratic models
is explored in section 2, where we provide some theoretical results on the price of anarchy for this
class of games. This includes our main result, Theorem 2, which provides a sufficient and necessary
condition to have no price of anarchy. In section 2, we also prove some limiting cases and show
numerical results. We conclude in section 3.
1.1 Nash Equilibrium: Mean Field Game Formulation
The goal of this subsection is to articulate what is meant by a feedback function providing a
mean field game equilibrium. To begin, we define what we call the mean field environment. By
symmetry of the players, we suppose all of the players in the mean field game use the same feedback
function, φ. Then the mean field environment specified by φ is characterized by L(Xφt )0≤t≤T
and L(φ(t,Xφt ))0≤t≤T where the dynamics of (Xφt )0≤t≤T are given by equation (1). Since we
search for a Nash equilibrium, we consider a representative agent who wishes to find their best
response, φ′, to the mean field environment specified by φ, in which case their state is given by
Xφ
′,φ = (Xφ
′,φ
t )0≤t≤T solving the standard stochastic differential equation:
dXφ
′,φ
t = b(t,X
φ′,φ
t ,L(Xφt ), φ′(t,Xφ
′,φ
t ),L(φ(t,Xφt )))dt + σdWt.
Consider the function:
S(φ′, φ) =
[∫ T
0
< f(t, ·,L(Xφt ), φ′(t, ·),L(φ(t,Xφt )),L(Xφ
′,φ
t )) > dt+ < g(·,L(XφT )),L(Xφ
′,φ
t ) >
]
.
The best response for the representative agent in the mean field environment specified by φ is the
feedback function minimizing this cost, namely φ∗ = arg infφ′ S(φ′, φ). Assuming the minimizer is
unique (which will be the case for the models we consider), this defines a mapping Φ : φ → φ∗. If
there is a φˆ such that Φ(φˆ) = φˆ, then the players are in a mean field game equilibrium.
Thus, the search for a feedback function providing a mean field game equilibrium can be sum-
marized as the following set of two successive steps:
1. For each feedback function φ : [0, T ]× R ∋ (t, x)→ R, solve the optimal control problem
φ∗ = arg inf
φ′
S(φ′, φ).
Define the mapping Φ(φ) := φ∗.
2. Find a fixed point φˆ of Φ such that Φ(φˆ) = φˆ.
When these two steps can be taken successfully, we say that φˆ provides a mean field game
equilibrium. Note that Xφˆ,φˆ = Xφˆ and therefore S(φˆ, φˆ) = SC(φˆ) gives the social cost for the
mean field game equilibrium provided by φˆ. Notice that there could possibly be many feedback
functions providing a mean field game equilibrium. Let N denote the set of all such feedback
functions providing mean field game equilibria, as detailed above, i.e.
N = {φ : [0, T ]× R ∋ (t, x)→ R | Φ(φ) = φ}.
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1.2 Centralized Control: Optimal Control of McKean-Vlasov Type
The goal of this subsection is to articulate how to compute the cost associated with the control
problem of McKean-Vlasov type, SCMKV . The central planner considers the following control
problem:
φˆ = arg inf
φ
SC(φ)
= arg inf
φ
[∫ T
0
< f(t, · ,L(Xφt ), φ(t, · ),L(φ(t,Xφt ))),L(Xφt ) > dt + < g( · ,L(XφT )),L(XφT ) >
]
.
Thus, the cost of the solution to the optimal control problem of McKean-Vlasov is given by:
SCMKV = SC(φˆ).
Remark 1. We are not concerned with uniqueness for the control of McKean-Vlasov type problem,
because SCMKV = SC(φ1) = SC(φ2) is still well defined even if there are two different optimal
feedback functions φ1 and φ2 minimizing SC(φ).
1.3 Price of Anarchy
We have described two approaches to compute the optimal feedback function φ. In the mean
field game formulation, we require φ ∈ N , where N denotes the set of feedback functions providing
mean field game equilibria. In the optimal control of McKean-Vlasov type formulation, the optimal
control to be adopted by all players is computed by a central planner, who optimizes the social cost
function SC(φ) directly. Thus, we necessarily have:
SCMKV ≤ SC(φ), ∀φ ∈ N .
In other words, there is a ‘price of anarchy’ associated with allowing players to choose their controls
selfishly. We thus define the price of anarchy (denoted PoA) as the ratio between the worst case
cost for a mean field game equilibrium and the optimal cost computed by a central planner:
PoA =
supφ∈N SC(φ)
SCMKV
.
2 Price of Anarchy for Linear Quadratic Extended Mean Field
Games
The class of linear quadratic extended mean field games is a class of problems for which explicit
solutions can be computed analytically, and thus, we can compute the price of anarchy explicitly.
To the best of our knowledge, the case of linear quadratic extended mean field games has not been
explored in the literature, as well as computing the price of anarchy for this class of games.
To begin, we need to describe in more detail the two problems that will be used to compute
the price of anarchy: the linear quadratic extended mean field game, and the linear quadratic
control problem of McKean-Vlasov type with dependence on the law of the control. To specify the
problems, we only need to specify the drift and cost functions, b, f , and g introduced in section 1.
For the linear quadratic models, we take the drift to be linear:
b(t, x, µ, α, ν) = b1(t)x+ b¯1(t)µ¯+ b2(t)α+ b¯2(t)ν¯ ,
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where µ¯ denotes the mean of the measure µ, namely, µ¯ =
∫
R
xdµ(x), and similarly for ν¯. We take
the running and terminal costs to be quadratic:
f(t, x, µ, α, ν) =
1
2
[
q(t)x2 + q¯(t)(x− s(t)µ¯)2 + r(t)α2 + r¯(t)(α − s¯(t)ν¯)2] ,
g(x, µ) =
1
2
[
qTx
2 + q¯T (x− sT µ¯)2
]
.
Remark 2. If b¯2(t) ≡ 0 and r¯(t) ≡ 0, then we have the standard mean field game or control problem
of McKean-Vlasov type. (See Theorem 1 for assumptions that provide existence and uniqueness.)
2.1 Linear Quadratic Extended Mean Field Games
To solve the linear quadratic extended mean field game (LQEMFG), we begin by considering the
reduced Hamiltonian for this problem:
H(t, x, µ¯, α, ν¯, y) =
[
b1(t)x+ b¯1(t)µ¯+ b2(t)α + b¯2(t)ν¯
]
y
+
1
2
[
q(t)x2 + q¯(t)(x− s(t)µ¯)2 + r(t)α2 + r¯(t)(α− s¯(t)ν¯)2] ,
and whenever the flows µ¯ = (µ¯t)0≤t≤T and ν¯ = (ν¯t)0≤t≤T are fixed, we consider for each control
process α = (αt)0≤t≤T the adjoint equation:
dYt = −∂xH(t,Xt, µ¯t, αt, ν¯t, Yt)dt+ ZtdWt, YT = ∂xg(XT ,L(XT )).
According to the Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle, a sufficient condition for optimality is
∂αH(t,Xt, µ¯t, αˆt, ν¯t, Yt) = 0. Thus, we find the optimal control:
αˆt =
r¯(t)s¯(t)ν¯ − b2(t)Yt
r(t) + r¯(t)
. (2)
When solving the fixed point step, we identify ν¯t = E(αˆt). By taking the expectation, we find:
ν¯t = E(αˆt) = c
MFG(t)E(Yt), with c
MFG(t) = − b2(t)
r(t) + r¯(t)(1− s¯(t)) .
Thus, from equation (2) we have:
αˆt = a
MFG(t)Yt + b
MFG(t)E(Yt), (3)
with:
aMFG(t) = − b2(t)
r(t) + r¯(t)
, and bMFG(t) = − r¯(t)s¯(t)b2(t)
(r(t) + r¯(t))(r(t) + r¯(t)(1 − s¯(t))) .
Note that cMFG(t) = aMFG(t)+bMFG(t). The solution of the mean field game equilibrium problem
is given by the solution to the FBSDE system:{
dXt =
[
b1(t)Xt + b¯1(t)EXt + a
MFG(t)b2(t)Yt + (b
MFG(t)b2(t) + c
MFG(t)b¯2(t))EYt
]
dt+ σdWt
dYt = − [(q(t) + q¯(t))Xt − q¯(t)s(t)EXt + b1(t)Yt] dt+ ZtdWt,
(4)
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with initial condition X0 = ξ, a random variable with finite mean and variance, and terminal
condition YT = (qT + q¯T )XT − q¯T sTEXT .
This is a linear FBSDE of McKean-Vlasov type, which can be solved explicitly under mild
assumptions (or at least in the case of time-independent coefficients which we will consider later.
See Appendix A). Let η¯MFGt , η
MFG
t , x¯
MFG
t , and v
MFG
t denote the solutions for this problem as
described in the appendix so that:
Yt = η
MFG
t Xt + (η¯
MFG
t − ηMFGt )x¯MFGt , E(Yt) = η¯MFGt x¯MFGt ,
E(Xt) = x¯
MFG
t , V ar(Xt) = v
MFG,
provide a solution to the LQEMFG problem. Then from the appendix, we have:
• a scalar Riccati equation for η¯MFGt :
˙¯ηMFGt +
[
cMFG(t)(b2(t) + b¯2(t))
] ·(η¯MFGt )2+(2b1(t) + b¯1(t)) · η¯MFGt +q(t)+ q¯(t)(1−s(t)) = 0,
(5)
with terminal condition η¯MFGT = qT + q¯T (1− sT ),
• a linear first order ODE for x¯MFGt :
˙¯xMFGt =
[
b1(t) + b¯1(t) + c
MFG(t)(b2(t) + b¯2(t)) · η¯MFGt
] · x¯MFGt , (6)
with initial condition x¯MFG0 = E(ξ),
• a scalar Riccati equation for ηMFGt :
η˙MFGt + a
MFG(t)b2(t) · (ηMFGt )2 + 2b1(t) · ηMFGt + q(t) + q¯(t) = 0, (7)
with terminal condition ηMFGT = qT + q¯T ,
and where the dot is the standard ODE notation for a derivative. And thus, we obtain explicit
solutions for x¯MFGt and v
MFG
t :
x¯MFGt = E(ξ)e
∫ t
0(b1(s)+b¯1(s)+[c
MFG(s)(b2(s)+b¯2(s))]·η¯MFGs )ds, (8)
vMFGt = V ar(ξ)e
∫ t
0
2[b1(s)+aMFG(s)b2(s)·ηMFGs ]ds + σ2
∫ t
0
e2
∫ t
s [b1(u)+a
MFG(u)b2(u)ηMFGu ]duds. (9)
Let SCMFG := SC(φMFG) in which φMFG = φMFG(t, x) is the feedback function specified by this
solution, namely, from equation (3), we have:
φMFG(t, x) = aMFG(t)ηMFGt x+
[
aMFG(t)(η¯MFGt − ηMFGt ) + bMFG(t)η¯MFGt
]
x¯MFGt .
Then we can compute the social cost as described in section 1.1:
SCMFG =
1
2
[
(qT + q¯T )v
MFG
T + (qT + q¯T (1− sT )2)(x¯MFGT )2
+
∫ T
0
[
q(t) + q¯(t) + (r(t) + r¯(t))(aMFG(t)ηMFGt )
2
]
vMFGt dt (10)
+
∫ T
0
[
q(t) + q¯(t)(1− s(t))2 + (r(t) + r¯(t)(1 − s¯(t))2)(cMFG(t)η¯MFGt )2
]
(x¯MFGt )
2dt
]
,
where we have used the fact that:
E(φMFG(t,Xt)) = c
MFG(t)·η¯MFGt x¯MFGt and V ar(φMFG(t,Xt)) =
(
aMFG(t)ηMFGt
)2·vMFGt .
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2.2 Linear Quadratic Control of McKean-Vlasov Type Involving the Law of the
Control
To solve the linear quadratic optimal control problem of McKean-Vlasov type involving the law
of the control (LQEMKV), we begin with the reduced Hamiltonian, which is the same as in the
LQEMFG problem:
H(t, x, µ¯, α, ν¯, y) =
[
b1(t)x+ b¯1(t)µ¯+ b2(t)α + b¯2(t)ν¯
]
y
+
1
2
[
q(t)x2 + q¯(t)(x− s(t)µ¯)2 + r(t)α2 + r¯(t)(α− s¯(t)ν¯)2] .
Since we require ν¯t to be equal to E(αt) throughout the optimization, it is not sufficient to minimize
the Hamiltonian with respect to the α input alone in order to guarantee optimality. A sufficient
condition for control problems of McKean-Vlasov type involving the law of the control is derived
in [6]. Since we consider a Hamiltonian that depends on the means of µ¯ and ν¯ instead of the full
distributions, the sufficient condition reduces to the following (see section 4 in [6]):
∂αH(t,Xt,E(Xt), αˆt,E(αˆt), Yt) + E˜
[
∂ν¯H(t, X˜t,E(Xt), αˆt,E(αˆt), Y˜t)
]
= 0,
where the adjoint equation is given by:
 dYt = −
[
∂xH(t,Xt, µ¯t, αt, ν¯t, Yt) + E˜
[
∂µ¯H(t, X˜t, µ¯t, α˜t, ν¯t, Y˜t)
]]
dt+ ZtdWt
YT = ∂xg(XT ,L(XT )) + E˜
[
∂µ¯g(X˜T ,L(XT ))(XT )
]
,
and where (X˜ , Y˜ , α˜) denotes an independent copy of (X ,Y ,α). In the present LQ case, the
sufficient condition can be used to solve for:
αˆt = a
MKV (t)Yt + b
MKV (t)E(Yt), (11)
with:
aMKV (t) = − b2(t)
r(t) + r¯(t)
, and bMKV (t) = − 1
r(t) + r¯(t)
(
b¯2(t)− r¯(t)s¯(t)(s¯(t)− 2)(b2(t) + b¯2(t))
r(t) + r¯(t)(1 − s¯(t))2
)
.
Then E(αˆt) = c
MKV (t)E(Yt) with:
cMKV (t) = aMKV (t) + bMKV (t) = − b2(t) + b¯2(t)
r(t) + r¯(t)(1− s¯(t))2 .
So the solution of the optimal control problem of McKean-Vlasov type is given by the solution
to the FBSDE system:{
dXt =
[
b1(t)Xt + b¯1(t)EXt + a
MKV (t)b2(t)Yt + (b
MKV (t)b2(t) + c
MKV (t)b¯2(t))EYt
]
dt+ σdWt
dYt =−
[
(q(t) + q¯(t))Xt + s(t)q¯(t)(s(t)− 2)EXt + b1(t)Yt + b¯1(t)EYt
]
dt+ ZtdWt,
(12)
with initial condition X0 = ξ, and terminal condition YT = (qT + q¯T )XT + sT q¯T (sT − 2)EXT .
As in the previous section, this is a linear FBSDE of McKean-Vlasov type, which can be solved
explicitly under mild assumptions (or at least in the case of time-independent coefficients which we
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will consider later. See Appendix A). Let η¯MKVt , η
MKV
t , x¯
MKV
t , and v
MKV
t denote the solutions
for this problem as described in the appendix so that:
Yt = η
MKV
t Xt + (η¯
MKV
t − ηMKVt )x¯MKVt , E(Yt) = η¯MKVt x¯MKVt ,
E(Xt) = x¯
MKV
t , V ar(Xt) = v
MKV ,
provide a solution to the LQEMKV problem. Then from the appendix, we have:
• a scalar Riccati equation for η¯MKVt :
˙¯ηMKVt +
[
cMKV (t)(b2(t) + b¯2(t))
]·(η¯MKVt )2+2 (b1(t) + b¯1(t))·η¯MKVt +q(t)+q¯(t)(1−s(t))2 = 0,
(13)
with terminal condition η¯MKVT = qT + q¯T (1− sT )2,
• a linear first order ODE for x¯MKVt :
˙¯xMKVt =
[
b1(t) + b¯1(t) + c
MKV (t)(b2(t) + b¯2(t)) · η¯MKVt
] · x¯MKVt , (14)
with initial condition x¯MKV0 = E(ξ),
• a scalar Riccati equation for ηMKVt :
η˙MKVt + a
MKV (t)b2(t) · (ηMKVt )2 + 2b1(t) · ηMKVt + q(t) + q¯(t) = 0, (15)
with terminal condition ηMKVT = qT + q¯T ,
and where the dot is the standard ODE notation for a derivative. And thus, we obtain explicit
solutions for x¯MKVt and v
MKV
t :
x¯MKVt = E(ξ)e
∫ t
0 (b1(s)+b¯1(s)+[c
MKV (s)(b2(s)+b¯2(s))]·η¯MKVs )ds, (16)
vMKVt = V ar(ξ)e
∫ t
0
2[b1(s)+aMKV (s)b2(s)·ηMKVs ]ds + σ2
∫ t
0
e2
∫ t
s [b1(u)+a
MKV (u)b2(u)ηMKVu ]duds. (17)
Then SCMKV = SC(φMKV ) where φMKV is the feedback function specified by this solution,
namely, from equation (11), we have:
φMKV (t, x) = aMKV (t)ηMKVt x+
[
aMKV (t)(η¯MKVt − ηMKVt ) + bMKV (t)η¯MKVt
]
x¯MKVt .
Then we can compute the social cost, denoted SCMKV , as described in section 1.2:
SCMKV =
1
2
[
(qT + q¯T )v
MKV
T + (qT + q¯T (1− sT )2)(x¯MKVT )2
+
∫ T
0
[
q(t) + q¯(t) + (r(t) + r¯(t))(aMKV (t)ηMKVt )
2
]
vMKVt dt (18)
+
∫ T
0
[
q(t) + q¯(t)(1− s(t))2 + (r(t) + r¯(t)(1 − s¯(t))2)(cMKV (t)η¯MKVt )2
]
(x¯MKVt )
2dt
]
,
where we have used the fact that:
E(φMKV (t,Xt)) = c
MKV (t)·η¯MKVt x¯MKVt and V ar(φMKV (t,Xt)) =
(
aMKV (t)ηMKVt
)2·vMKVt .
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2.3 Theoretical Results
For the remainder of the paper, we assume the coefficients are independent of time and non-negative:
(b1(t), b¯1(t), b2(t), b¯2(t), q(t), q¯(t), r(t), r¯(t), s(t), s¯(t)) = (b1, b¯1, b2, b¯2, q, q¯, r, r¯, s, s¯) ∈ (R+)10,
(qT , q¯T , sT ) ∈ (R+)3,
and therefore, (
aMFG(t), bMFG(t), cMFG(t)
)
=
(
aMFG, bMFG, cMFG
)
(
aMKV (t), bMKV (t), cMKV (t)
)
=
(
aMKV , bMKV , cMKV
)
.
Also, it will be convenient to denote:
λ :=
cMFG
cMKV
=
b2
b2 + b¯2
· r + r¯(1− s¯)
2
r + r¯(1− s¯) , ut := λη¯
MFG
t , wt := η¯
MKV
t . (19)
and to make the following observations:
aMFG = aMKV =: a, ηMFGt = η
MKV
t =: ηt, v
MFG
t = v
MKV
t =: vt. (20)
Theorem 1. Assume the following:
b2 > 0 b2 + b¯2 > 0
r + r¯ > 0 r + r¯(1− s¯) > 0 r + r¯(1− s¯)2 > 0
q + q¯ > 0 q + q¯(1− s) > 0 q + q¯(1− s)2 > 0
qT + q¯T ≥ 0 qT + q¯T (1− sT ) ≥ 0 qT + q¯T (1− sT )2 ≥ 0.
(21)
Then there exists a unique solution to the LQEMFG problem, and there exists a unique solution to
the LQEMKV problem. And therefore, PoA = SC
MFG
SCMKV
where SCMFG and SCMKV are given by
equations (10) and (18), respectively.
Remark 3. Note that existence in Theorem 1 follows from the explicit construction in Appendix A,
because the above conditions provide existence to the solutions of the Riccati equations. Uniqueness
comes from the connection between LQEMFG or LQEMKV and deterministic LQ optimal control.
(See section 3.5.1 in [8]).
Proposition 1. Assuming (21), if furthermore,[
b¯1η¯
MKV
t + sq¯(s− 1)
] · x¯MKVt = 0, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] (22)(
cMFG − cMKV ) · η¯MKVt x¯MKVt = 0, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] (23)
sT q¯T (sT − 1) · x¯MKVT = 0, (24)
then PoA = 1.
Proof. Comparing the FBSDE systems (4) and (12), and using the fact that aMFG = aMKV and
bMFG − bMKV = cMFG − cMKV , the result is clear.
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Remark 4. Recall from Remark 2 that in the standard mean field game, b¯2 = r¯ = 0, and thus,
λ = 1. Although Proposition 1 is a simple result, we will see shortly in Corollary 3 that in the case
when λ = 1, the sufficient condition given by equations (22)-(24) is also a necessary condition to
have PoA = 1. We can see that in the standard mean field game setting, Proposition 1 is similar
to Theorem 3.4 in [5] which characterizes the global efficiency of mean field game equilibria in the
case of a separated Hamiltonian. See also Remark 6.1 in [15], where it is noted that the mean field
game and control of McKean-Vlasov type problems are the same for a particular model of flocking.
Corollary 1. Assuming (21), if furthermore, b¯1 = 0, sq¯(s − 1) = 0, sT q¯T (sT − 1) = 0, and
cMFG = cMKV , then PoA = 1.
Corollary 2. Assuming (21), if the initial condition ξ is such that E(ξ) = 0, then from equation
(16), xMKVt = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], and thus, PoA = 1.
Using the observations in equation (20), we can rewrite:
SCMFG =
1
2
(qT + q¯T )vT +
1
2
(
qT + q¯T (1− sT )2
)
(x¯MFGT )
2 +
1
2
∫ T
0
[
q + q¯ + (r + r¯)(aηt)
2
]
vtdt
+
1
2
∫ T
0
[
q + q¯(1− s)2 + (r + r¯(1− s¯)2)(cMFGη¯MFGt )2
]
(x¯MFGt )
2dt, (25)
SCMKV =
1
2
(qT + q¯T )vT +
1
2
(
qT + q¯T (1− sT )2
)
(x¯MKVT )
2 +
1
2
∫ T
0
[
q + q¯ + (r + r¯)(aηt)
2
]
vtdt
+
1
2
∫ T
0
[
q + q¯(1− s)2 + (r + r¯(1− s¯)2)(cMKV η¯MKVt )2
)
](x¯MKVt )
2dt. (26)
In the following, we intend to simplify the explicit solutions (25) and (26) for the social costs in
the LQEMFG and LQEMKV problems. First, consider the quantity
∫ T
0 (η¯
MFG
t )
2(x¯MFGt )
2dt. Using
equation (5), we have:∫ T
0
(η¯MFGt )
2(x¯MFGt )
2dt
= − 1
cMFG(b2 + b¯2)
[∫ T
0
˙¯ηMFGt (x¯
MFG
t )
2dt+
∫ T
0
[
(2b1 + b¯1)η¯
MFG
t + (q + q¯(1− s))
]
(x¯MFGt )
2dt
]
,
then using integration by parts for the first term in the bracket:
= − 1
cMFG(b2 + b¯2)
[
η¯MFGT (x¯
MFG
T )
2 − η¯MFG0 (x¯MFG0 )2 − 2
∫ T
0
η¯MFGt x¯
MFG
t · ˙¯xMFGt dt
+
∫ T
0
[
(2b1 + b¯1)η¯
MFG
t + (q + q¯(1− s))
]
(x¯MFGt )
2dt
]
,
and together with equation (6) yields:
= 2
∫ T
0
(η¯MFGt )
2(x¯MFGt )
2dt− 1
cMFG(b2 + b¯2)
[
η¯MFGT (x¯
MFG
T )
2 − η¯MFG0 (E(ξ))2
+
∫ T
0
[−b¯1η¯MFGt + (q + q¯(1− s))] (x¯MFGt )2dt
]
.
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Finally, we arrive at:
∫ T
0
(η¯MFGt )
2(x¯MFGt )
2dt =
η¯MFGT (x¯
MFG
T )
2 − η¯MFG0 (E(ξ))2 +
∫ T
0
[−b¯1η¯MFGt + (q + q¯(1− s))] (x¯MFGt )2dt
cMFG(b2 + b¯2)
.
If we denote:
hvar :=
1
2
∫ T
0
[
q + q¯ + (r + r¯)(aηt)
2
]
vtdt+
1
2
(qT + q¯T )vT ,
and use the terminal condition for η¯MFGT , then equation (25) can be rewritten as:
SCMFG = hvar +
1
2
∫ T
0
[
b¯1λη¯
MFG
t + (q + q¯(1− s)2)− λ(q + q¯(1− s))
]
(x¯MFGt )
2dt, (27)
+
1
2
λ
[
η¯MFG0 (E(ξ))
2 − (qT + q¯T (1− sT ))(x¯MFGT )2
]
+
1
2
(qT + q¯T (1− sT )2)(x¯MFGT )2.
Similarly, equation (26) can be rewritten as:
SCMKV = hvar +
1
2
η¯MKV0 (E(ξ))
2. (28)
Let’s denote the (weighted) difference between the solutions of the Riccati equations associated
with η¯MFGt and η¯
MKV
t by:
∆η¯t := λη¯
MFG
t − η¯MKVt = ut − wt. (29)
Proposition 2. Under assumption (21), the difference in the social costs in the LQEMFG and
LQEMKV problems can be represented by:
∆SC := SCMFG − SCMKV = 1
2
· (b2 + b¯2)
2
r + r¯(1− s¯)2
∫ T
0
(∆η¯t · x¯MFGt )2dt. (30)
Proof. The solutions η¯MFGt and η¯
MKV
t for the Riccati equations (5) and (13), respectively, are well
defined under assumption (21) (see Appendix A). We notice that ∆η¯t defined in (29) satisfies the
following linear first-order differential equation:
d(∆η¯t)
dt
= γt∆η¯t + βt, ∆η¯T = λη¯
MFG
T − η¯MKVT ,
with coefficients:
γt = −2b1 − 2b¯1 + (b2 + b¯2)
2
r + r¯(1− s¯)2
(
λη¯MFGt + η¯
MKV
t
)
,
βt = b¯1λη¯
MFG
t + (q + q¯(1− s)2)− λ(q + q¯(1− s)).
Since qT + q¯T (1− sT ) = η¯MFGT , qT + q¯T (1− sT )2 = η¯MKVT and λη¯MFG0 − η¯MKV0 = ∆η¯0, we deduce
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from equations (27) and (28) that:
SCMFG − SCMKV = 1
2
[
∆η¯0(E(ξ))
2 −∆η¯T (x¯MFGT )2 +
∫ T
0
βt(x¯
MFG
t )
2dt
]
=
1
2
∫ T
0
[
−d(∆η¯t(x¯
MFG
t )
2)
dt
+
(
d(∆η¯t)
dt
− γt∆η¯t
)
(x¯MFGt )
2
]
dt
=
1
2
∫ T
0
[−2∆η¯tx¯MFGt ˙¯xMFGt − γt∆η¯t(x¯MFGt )2] dt
=
1
2
∫ T
0
∆η¯t(x¯
MFG
t )
2
[
−2
(
b1 + b¯1 − (b2 + b¯2)
2
r + r¯(1− s¯)2λη¯
MFG
t
)
− γt
]
dt
=
1
2
· (b2 + b¯2)
2
r + r¯(1− s¯)2
∫ T
0
(∆η¯t · x¯MFGt )2dt,
where we use equation (6) for the fourth equality.
Remark 5. We can see directly from Proposition 2 that the social cost in the LQEMFG problem is
larger than (or possibly equal to) the social cost in the LQEMKV problem. This result is consistent
with the definition of the price of anarchy in section 1.3.
Note that we can write:
PoA = 1 +
∆SC
SCMKV
. (31)
It will be useful for us to note here the scalar Riccati equations associated with ut = λη¯
MFG
t ,
wt = η¯
MKV
t and ηt:
u˙t − 2Auut −Bu2t + Cu = 0, uT = Du, (32)
w˙t − 2Awwt −Bw2t + Cw = 0, wT = Dw, (33)
η˙t − 2Aηηt −Bηη2t + Cη = 0, ηT = Dη, (34)
with:
Au = −
(
b1 +
b¯1
2
)
, Aw = −(b1 + b¯1), Aη = −b1,
Bu =
(b2 + b¯2)
2
r + r¯(1− s¯)2 , B
w =
(b2 + b¯2)
2
r + r¯(1− s¯)2 , B
η =
b22
r + r¯
,
Cu = λ(q + q¯(1− s)), Cw = q + q¯(1− s)2, Cη = q + q¯,
Du = λ(qT + q¯T (1− sT )), Dw = qT + q¯T (1− sT )2, Dη = qT + q¯T . (35)
If Bu 6= 0, BuDu ≥ 0 and BuCu > 0, we have (see equation (73) in Appendix A) the existence and
uniqueness for ut which can be expressed by:
ut =
Cu(1− e−(δ+u −δ−u )(T−t)) +Du(δ+u − δ−u e−(δ
+
u −δ
−
u )(T−t))
BuDu(1− e−(δ+u −δ−u )(T−t)) + δ+u e−(δ+u −δ−u )(T−t) − δ−u
, (36)
with δ±u = −Au ±
√
(Au)2 +BuCu. Under assumption (21), the above conditions on Bu, Cu, and
Du are satisfied, and we have δ−u < 0 < δ
+
u , ut > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ), and uT ≥ 0. We have analogous
expressions for wt and ηt, in terms of δ
±
w and δ
±
η , respectively. Note that B
u = Bw =: B.
13
It will also be useful to compute the derivative of ut with respect to time t from the explicit
form in equation (36):
dut
dt
=
(
B(Du)2 + 2AuDu − Cu) · (δ+u − δ−u )2 e−(δ+u −δ−u )(T−t)[
BDu(1− e−(δ+u −δ−u )(T−t)) + δ+u e−(δ+u −δ−u )(T−t) − δ−u
]2 . (37)
Note that ut is increasing if B(D
u)2 + 2AuDu − Cu > 0, and likewise, decreasing if B(Du)2 +
2AuDu − Cu < 0.
Theorem 2. Assume (21) and the initial condition ξ satisfies E(ξ) 6= 0. Let Au, Aw, B, Cu, Cw,
Du, and Dw as defined in equation (35).
• When b¯1 > 0, we have PoA = 1 if and only if:
Du = Dw =: D and BD2 + 2AuD − Cu = BD2 + 2AwD − Cw = 0. (38)
• When b¯1 = 0, then Au = Aw and we have PoA = 1 if and only if:
Du = Dw and Cu = Cw. (39)
Proof. From an analogous equation to (36) for wt, we know that under assumption (21), w0 > 0.
Thus, with the assumption E(ξ) 6= 0, we have 0 < SCMKV < ∞. Hence, PoA = 1 if and only if
∆SC = 0. Since x¯MFGt 6= 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], from Proposition 2 and the continuity of ut and wt,
we deduce that:
PoA = 1 if and only if ut = wt, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
From equation (37) and the uniqueness of solutions to Riccati equations (32) and (33), it is
easy to check that if the conditions in (38) and (39) are satisfied, then ut = D
u = Dw = wt for all
t ∈ [0, T ], and thus, PoA = 1.
Suppose now that PoA = 1. Then ut = wt for all t ∈ [0, T ] and clearly:
Du = uT = wT = D
w.
Now, if we take the difference between the two Riccati equations (32) and (33), and by using ut = wt
for all t ∈ [0, T ], we obtain:
2(Au −Aw)wt = Cu − Cw, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]. (40)
Since 2(Au −Aw) = b¯1, in the case when b¯1 = 0 we must have Cu = Cw. Otherwise, equation (40)
implies that ut = wt = (C
u − Cw)/b¯1, are constant for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Thus, the time derivatives of
ut and wt should be zero. From equation (37), and the fact that δ
+
u − δ−u > 0, we deduce:
B(Du)2 + 2AuDu − Cu = 0.
Similarly we also have B(Dw)2 + 2AwDw − Cw = 0.
Corollary 3. Assume (21) and λ = 1. Then the sufficient condition (equations (22)-(24)) from
Proposition 1 is also a necessary condition to have PoA = 1.
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Proof. Assume PoA = 1. Since λ = 1, we have cMFG = cMKV and thus, condition (23) holds. If
E(ξ) = 0, clearly conditions (22)-(24) hold, as noted in Corollary 2. If E(ξ) 6= 0 and b¯1 = 0, from
Theorem 2, we have Du = Dw and Cu = Cw which together with λ = 1 imply conditions (22) and
(24), similarly as Corollary 1. Now, if E(ξ) 6= 0 and b¯1 > 0, from Theorem 2, we have Du = Dw
which implies condition (24). Finally, the condition B(D)2+2AuD−Cu = B(D)2+2AwD−Cw = 0
implies η¯MKVt = wt = D =
Cu−Cw
2(Au−A2) =
sq¯(1−s)
b¯1
and thus, we have condition (22).
We study in the following the variation of PoA by letting only one of the coefficients tend to
zero or to infinity. In order to make the following computations easier to follow, we repeat equations
(30), (28), (8), and (9), which we recall is equivalent to equation (17), using the above notations.
Assuming (21), we have:
∆SC =
1
2
B
∫ T
0
(ut − wt)2 · (x¯MFGt )2dt, (41)
SCMKV =
1
2
∫ T
0
[
q + q¯ +Bηη2t
]
vtdt+
(qT + q¯T )
2
vT +
1
2
w0(E(ξ))
2, (42)
x¯MFGt = E(ξ)e
∫ t
0
(b1+b¯1−Bus)ds, (43)
vt = V ar(ξ)e
∫ t
0
2(b1−Bηηs)ds + σ2
∫ t
0
e2
∫ t
s
(b1−Bηηu)duds. (44)
Also for convenience, recall the definition from equation (19): λ =
b2
b2 + b¯2
· r + r¯(1− s¯)
2
r + r¯(1− s¯) .
In the following propositions, we utilize the following assumption to make their proofs simpler.
Assumption 1. Assume (21). In addition, assume: b1 > 0, D
u > 0, Dw > 0, Dη > 0 and the
initial condition satisfies E(ξ) 6= 0.
Proposition 3. Assuming Assumption 1, then:
lim
r→∞
PoA = 1 and lim
r¯→∞
PoA = 1.
Proof. First, we consider r →∞. For every given r > 0, we have existence and uniqueness of the
solutions urt , w
r
t and η
r
t to the scalar Riccati equations (32)-(34). Note that we have added the
superscript r to emphasize the dependence on this parameter.
When r →∞, we have:
λr −→ λr→∞ := b2
b2 + b¯2
,
and
Br −→ 0, Bη,r −→ 0,
Cu,r −→ Cu,r→∞ := λr→∞(q + q¯(1 − s)), Du,r → Du,r→∞ := λr→∞(qT + q¯T (1− sT )).
Let ur→∞ : [0, T ]→ R be the solution to the linear first-order differential equation:
(ur→∞t )
′ − 2Auur→∞t + Cu,r→∞ = 0, ur→∞T = Du,r→∞.
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Then we have:
ur→∞t =
(
Du,r→∞ − C
u,r→∞
2Au
)
e−2A
u(T−t) +
Cu,r→∞
2Au
.
It is easy to show directly from their explicit solutions (see equation (36)) that for every time
t ∈ [0, T ],
lim
r→∞
urt = u
r→∞
t , and thus, limr→∞
Brurt = 0.
Next, our goal is to bound the urt uniformly over t ∈ [0, T ] for large r. Note that Au < 0, Br,
Cu,r, λr→∞, Cu,r→∞, Du,r, Du,r→∞ > 0, and δ−,ru < 0 < δ
+,r
u . Let ǫ > 0. Then there exists a
r∗ > 0 such that max{Br, Cu,r,Du,r} ≤ max{Cu,r→∞,Du,r→∞}+ ǫ =: ζ for r ≥ r∗. Thus, we can
deduce that for r ≥ r∗, and for every t ∈ [0, T ]:
|urt | ≤
Cu,r +Du,r(δ+,ru − δ−,ru )
δ+,ru e−(δ
+,r
u −δ
−,r
u )(T−t)
≤ ζ + 2ζ
√
(Au)2 + ζ2
−2Aue−2T
√
(Au)2+ζ2
.
From equation (43) and by the bounded convergence theorem, we have for every t ∈ [0, T ]:
lim
r→∞
x¯MFG,rt = E(ξ)e
(b1+b¯1)t =: x¯MFG,r→∞t .
Moreover, x¯MFG,rt is uniformly bounded for t ∈ [0, T ]. From the non-negativity of urt , we have:∣∣∣x¯MFG,rt ∣∣∣ ≤ |E(ξ)|e(b1+b¯1)T , ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Similarly, for every t ∈ [0, T ]:
lim
r→∞
wrt =: w
r→∞
t , limr→∞
ηrt =: η
r→∞
t ,
and the functions wrt and η
r
t are uniformly bounded over t ∈ [0, T ] and large r. By the bounded
convergence theorem we have for every t ∈ [0, T ]:
lim
r→∞
∫ T
0
(urt − wrt )2(x¯MFG,rt )2dt =
∫ T
0
(ur→∞t − wr→∞t )2(x¯MFG,r→∞t )2dt <∞,
and thus, from equation (41):
lim
r→∞
∆SCr = lim
r→∞
1
2
· Br
∫ T
0
(urt − wrt )2(x¯MFG,rt )2dt = 0.
From equation (44) and by the bounded convergence theorem, we have for every t ∈ [0, T ]:
lim
r→∞
vrt = V ar(ξ)e
2b1t + σ2
∫ t
0
e2b1(t−s)ds =: vr→∞t .
We also have wr→∞0 > 0 and v
r→∞
t > 0 for t > 0. Hence, from equation (42):
lim
r→∞
SCMKV,r =
1
2
(∫ T
0
(q + q¯)vr→∞t dt+ (qT + q¯T )v
r→∞
T + w
r→∞
0 (E(ξ))
2
)
> 0.
Therefore, from equation (31), we have:
lim
r→∞
PoAr = 1.
By replacing λr→∞ with λr¯→∞ := b2
b2+b¯2
(1 − s¯), the proof can be repeated, and we obtain
lim
r¯→∞
PoAr¯ = 1.
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Proposition 4. Assume Assumption 1. If:
q + q¯(1− s)
r + r¯(1− s¯) =
q + q¯(1− s)2
r + r¯(1− s¯)2 ,
then:
lim
b2→∞
PoA = 1.
Otherwise,
lim
b2→∞
PoA > 1.
Proof. When b2 →∞, we have:
λb2 → r+r¯(1−s¯)2r+r¯(1−s¯) =: λb2→∞, Bb2 →∞, Bη,b2 →∞
Cu,b2 → λb2→∞(q + q¯(1− s)) =: Cu,b2→∞, Du,b2 → λb2→∞(qT + q¯T (1− sT )) =: Du,b2→∞ > 0,
and Au, (Aw, Cw,Dw), (Aη , Cη,Dη) are independent of b2. Moreover, we notice that:
δ±,b2u
b2 + b¯2
= − A
u
b2 + b¯2
±
√
(Au)2
(b2 + b¯2)2
+
Cu,b2
r + r¯(1− s¯)2 −−−−→b2→∞ ±
√
q + q¯(1− s)
r + r¯(1− s¯) =: ±cδu ,
and thus, limb2→∞ δ
+,b2
u − δ−,b2u = +∞. For the sake of simplicity, denote hu(b2, t) := (b2 + b¯2)ub2t
and hw(b2, t) := (b2 + b¯2)w
b2
t . From equation (36), for all t ∈ [0, T ), we deduce:
hu(b2, t) =
(
Cu,b2
b2 + b¯2
+Du,b2 · δ
+,b2
u
b2 + b¯2
)
−
(
Cu,b2
b2 + b¯2
+Du,b2 · δ
−,b2
u
b2 + b¯2
)
e−(δ
+,b2
u −δ
−,b2
u )(T−t)
(
−δ−,b2u
(b2 + b¯2)2
+
Du,b2
r + r¯(1− s¯)2
)
+
(
δ+,b2u
(b2 + b¯2)2
− D
u,b2
r + r¯(1− s¯)2
)
e−(δ
+,b2
u −δ
−,b2
u )(T−t)
−−−−→
b2→∞
(r + r¯(1− s¯)2)cδu =: cu.
Similarly, for all t ∈ [0, T ):
lim
b2→∞
hw(b2, t) = (r + r¯(1− s¯)2)cδw =: cw, with cδw :=
√
q + q¯(1− s)2
r + r¯(1− s¯)2 ,
and
lim
b2→∞
b2η
b2
t = (r + r¯)cδη =: cη , with cδη :=
√
q + q¯
r + r¯
.
Next, we derive a strictly positive uniform lower bound for (b2 + b¯2)u
b2
t over [0, T ] and large b2.
Let ζ1 :=
1
2 min
{
cδu ,D
u,b2→∞
}
. Then there exists a b∗,u,lower2 > 0 such that for all b2 ≥ b∗,u,lower2 :
max
{∣∣∣∣∣ δ
+,b2
u
b2 + b¯2
− cδu
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
∣∣∣∣∣ δ
−,b2
u
b2 + b¯2
− (−cδu)
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
∣∣∣Du,b2 −Du,b2→∞∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣ 1b2 + b¯2
∣∣∣∣
}
≤ ζ1,
17
and thus for all t ∈ [0, T ]:
hu(b2, t) ≥ (b2 + b¯2) D
u,b2δ+,b2u
(δ+,b2u − δ−,b2u ) +Bb2Du,b2
≥ (D
u,b2→∞ − ζ1)(cδu − ζ1)
ζ1(2cδu + 2ζ1) + (D
u,b2→∞ + ζ1)/(r + r¯(1− s¯)2) =: mu > 0. (45)
Then, by the same technique in inequality (45), there exists a b∗,η,lower2 > 0 and mη > 0 such that
for all b2 ≥ b∗,η,lower2 and all t ∈ [0, T ]:
b2η
b2
t ≥ mη. (46)
From equation (37), we see that t 7→ ub2t is increasing if Bb2(Du,b2)2 + 2AuDu,b2 − Cu,b2 > 0.
Since limb2→∞B
b2(Du,b2)2 + 2AuDu,b2 − Cu,b2 = ∞, there exists a b∗,u,upper2 > 0 such that for all
b2 ≥ b∗,u,upper2 , we have |Du,b2 −Du,b2→∞| ≤ 1 and t 7→ ub2t is increasing. Therefore,
ub2t ≤ ub2T = Du,b2 ≤ Du,b2→∞ + 1, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], b2 ≥ b∗,u,upper2 .
By the same argument for wb2t and η
b2
t , there exists a b
∗,upper
2 ≥ b∗,u,upper2 such that:
max
{∣∣∣ub2t ∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣wb2t ∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣ηb2t ∣∣∣} ≤M, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], b2 ≥ b∗,upper2 , (47)
and such that the functions t 7→ ub2t , t 7→ wb2t and t 7→ ηb2t are increasing on [0, T ].
Case 1: Assume:
q + q¯(1− s)
r + r¯(1− s¯) =
q + q¯(1− s)2
r + r¯(1− s¯)2 .
Then cδu = cδw and therefore, cu = cw =: c. We want to show that limb2→∞
∆SCb2
SCMKV,b2
= 0. Our
approach is to split the interval [0, T ] into two parts: [0, T/2] and [T/2, T ]. Since vb2t ≥ 0 for all
t ∈ [0, T ], from equations (41) and (42), we have SCMKV,b2 ≥ wb20 (E(ξ))2 and thus:
∆SCb2
SCMKV,b2
≤ 1
wb20 E(ξ)
2
(
Bb2
∫ T
2
0
(ub2t − wb2t )2(x¯MFG,b2t )2dt+Bb2
∫ T
T
2
(ub2t − wb2t )2(x¯MFG,b2t )2dt
)
=
1
(b2 + b¯2)w
b2
0
(
Ib21 + I
b2
2
)
,
(48)
with:
Ib21 =
(b2 + b¯2)
3
r + r¯(1 − s¯)2
∫ T
2
0
(ub2t − wb2t )2e2(b1+b¯1)t exp
(
−2Bb2
∫ t
0
ub2s ds
)
dt
=
b2 + b¯2
r + r¯(1 − s¯)2
∫ T
2
0
[hu(b2, t)− hw(b2, t)]2 · e2(b1+b¯1)t exp
(
− 2(b2 + b¯2)
r + r¯(1− s¯)2
∫ t
0
hu(b2, s)ds
)
dt,
and:
Ib22 =
(b2 + b¯2)
3
r + r¯(1− s¯)2
∫ T
T
2
(ub2t − wb2t )2e2(b1+b¯1)t exp
(
− 2(b2 + b¯2)
r + r¯(1− s¯)2
∫ t
0
hu(b2, s)ds
)
dt.
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Fix ǫ > 0. In the following, we show that Ib21 ≤ ǫ and Ib22 ≤ ǫ for large b2. First, consider
Ib21 . Recall that for t ∈ [0, T/2], we have limb2→∞ hu(b2, t) = limb2→∞ hw(b2, t) = c, and for all
b2 ≥ b∗,upper2 , the functions [0, T/2] ∋ s 7→ ub2s and [0, T/2] ∋ s 7→ wb2s are increasing, and thus,
[0, T/2] ∋ s 7→ hu(b2, t) and [0, T/2] ∋ s 7→ hw(b2, t) are increasing. (Note that T/2 < T is chosen
arbitrarily, since the above limits do not hold at T .) Let ζ2 := min
{
c
2 ,
1
2e
−T (b1+b¯2)
√
ǫc
}
. Then
there exists a b∗,I12 ≥ b∗,upper2 such that for all b2 ≥ b∗,I12 and all s ∈ [0, T/2] we have:
c− ζ2 ≤ hu(b2, 0) ≤ hu(b2, s) ≤ hu(b2, T/2) ≤ c+ ζ2,
c− ζ2 ≤ hw(b2, 0) ≤ hw(b2, s) ≤ hw(b2, T/2) ≤ c+ ζ2.
Thus, for any t ∈ [0, T/2] and b2 ≥ b∗,I12 :
|hu(b2, t)− hw(b2, t)|2 ≤ 4ζ22 and
∫ t
0
hu(b2, s)ds ≥ (c− ζ2)t ≥ c
2
· t.
Therefore,
Ib21 ≤ 4ζ22e2T (b1+b¯1) ·
(b2 + b¯2)
r + r¯(1− s¯)2
∫ T
2
0
exp
(
− 2(b2 + b¯2)
r + r¯(1− s¯)2 ·
c
2
· t
)
dt
=
4e2T (b1+b¯1)
c
(
1− e−
(b2+b¯2)c
r+r¯(1−s¯)2
T
2
)
ζ22 ≤ ǫ, (49)
where the last inequality comes from the definition of ζ2.
Next, consider Ib22 . Since u
b2
t is positive over [0, T ], we know from the inequalities (45) and (47)
that for all b2 ≥ max{b∗,upper2 , b∗,u,lower2 } and all t ∈ [T/2, T ]:
∣∣∣ub2t − wb2t ∣∣∣ ≤ sup
0≤s≤T
∣∣∣ub2s ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣wb2s ∣∣∣ ≤ 2M, and ∫ t
0
hu(b2, s)ds ≥
∫ T
2
0
hu(b2, s)ds ≥ T
2
mu > 0.
Hence, there exists a b∗,I22 ≥ max{b∗,upper2 , b∗,u,lower2 } such that for all b2 ≥ b∗,I22 :
Ib22 ≤
(b2 + b¯2)
3
r + r¯(1− s¯)2 · 4M
2e2(b1+b¯1)T
∫ T
T
2
exp
(
− T (b2 + b¯2)
r + r¯(1− s¯)2 ·mu
)
dt
= κ1(b2 + b¯2)
3e−κ2(b2+b¯2) ≤ ǫ, (50)
with κ1 :=
2TM2e2(b1+b¯1)T
r+r¯(1−s¯)2 > 0 and κ2 :=
Tmu
r+r¯(1−s¯)2 > 0 are constants independent of b2.
Let b∗2 := max{b∗,I12 , b∗,I22 }. Then inequalities (48), (49) and (50) give for b2 ≥ b∗2:
∆SCb2
SCMKV,b2
≤ I
b2
1 + I
b2
2
(b2 + b¯2)w
b2
0
≤ ǫ+ ǫ
hw(b2, 0)
≤ 2ǫ
c/2
=
4ǫ
c
.
Since the proof holds for arbitrary ǫ > 0, and c =
√
(q + q¯(1− s)2)(r + r¯(1− s¯)2) > 0 is indepen-
dent of b2 and ǫ, we conclude:
lim
b2→∞
∆SCb2
SCMKV,b2
= 0,
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and thus, from equation (31):
lim
b2→∞
PoAb2 = 1.
Case 2: Assume:
q + q¯(1− s)
r + r¯(1− s¯) 6=
q + q¯(1− s)2
r + r¯(1− s¯)2 .
Then cu 6= cw. We want to show that limb2→∞ PoAb2 > 1. To do so, we will show that
(b2 + b¯2)∆SC
b2 ≥ cnum > 0 and b2SCMKV,b2 ≤ Mden < ∞ for large b2, where cnum and
Mden are two constants independent of b2. We assume in the following that b2 ≥ b∗,basic2 :=
max{b∗,u,lower2 , b∗,η,lower2 , b∗,upper2 }, as defined prior to Case 1. Therefore, s 7→ ub2s , s 7→ wb2s and
s 7→ ηηs are increasing functions. Moreover, from inequalities (45)-(47), we have hu(b2, t) ≥ mu > 0,
b2η
b2
t ≥ mη > 0, and ηb2t ≤M <∞, for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Step 1: We derive a lower bound for (b2+b¯2)∆SC
b2 by adapting the techniques used in inequality
(49). We have shown that for every t ∈ [0, T/2], limb2→∞ hu(b2, t) = cu and limb2→∞ hw(b2, t) = cw.
Let ζ3 = ln(2)
r+r¯(1−s¯)2
T (cu+|cu−cw|/4)
− b¯2. Then, there exists a b∗,num2 ≥ max{b∗,basic2 , ζ3} such that for all
b2 ≥ b∗,num2 and all s ∈ [0, T/2]:
cu − |cu − cw| /4 ≤ hu(b2, 0) ≤ hu(b2, s) ≤ hu(b2, T/2) ≤ cu + |cu − cw| /4,
cw − |cu − cw| /4 ≤ hw(b2, 0) ≤ hw(b2, s) ≤ hw(b2, T/2) ≤ cw + |cu − cw| /4,
which implies that for all t ∈ [0, T/2]:
|hu(b2, t)− hw(b2, t)| ≥ 1
2
|cu − cw| ,
∫ t
0
hu(b2, s)ds ≤
(
cu +
1
4
|cu − cw|
)
t.
Thus, similar to inequality (49), for all b2 ≥ b∗,num2 , we deduce:
(b2 + b¯2)∆SC
b2 ≥ b2 + b¯2
2
Bb2
∫ T
2
0
(ub2t − wb2t )2(x¯MFG,b2)2dt
≥ |cu − cw|
2 (E(ξ))2
8(r + r¯(1− s¯)2) · (b2 + b¯2)
∫ T
2
0
exp
[
− 2(b2 + b¯2)
r + r¯(1− s¯)2
(
cu +
1
4
|cu − cw|
)
t
]
dt
=
|cu − cw|2 (E(ξ))2
16(cu + |cu − cw|/4)
(
1− e−
T (cu+|cu−cw|/4)
r+r¯(1−s¯)2
(b2+b¯2)
)
≥ |cu − cw|
2 (E(ξ))2
16(cu + |cu − cw|/4) ·
1
2
=: cnum. (51)
Step 2: We derive an upper bound for b2SC
MKV,b2. From equation (42), we have:
b2SC
MKV,b2 =
[
q + q¯
2
∫ T
0
b2vtdt+
qT + q¯T
2
b2vT +
b2
2
wb20 (E(ξ))
2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: J b21
+
1
2
∫ T
0
Bη,b2(ηb2t )
2 · b2vtdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: J b22
.
(52)
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We derive the following two results which are useful for deriving upper bounds for Jb21 and J
b2
2 .
First, let κ3 :=
2mη
r+r¯ > 0 and l(b2, t) :=
∫ t
0
e−2B
η,b2
∫ t
s
η
b2
u duds. Since b2ηt ≥ mη for all t ∈ [0, T ]:
b2 · l(b2, t) ≤ b2
∫ t
0
exp
(
−2 b2
r + r¯
mη · (t− s)
)
ds =
1
κ3
(1− e−κ3b2t) ≤ 1
κ3
, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]. (53)
Next, using equation (34), integration by parts, and since −Aη, ηb2t , Cη, l(b2, t) ≥ 0 we deduce:∫ T
0
Bη,b2(ηb2t )
2 · l(b2, t)dt =
∫ T
0
(ηb2t )
′ · l(b2, t)dt+
∫ T
0
(
−2Aηηb2t + Cη
)
· l(b2, t)dt
≥
[
ηb2T l(b2, T )− ηb20 l(b2, 0)−
∫ T
0
ηb2t ·
∂(l(b2, t))
∂t
dt
]
= −
∫ T
0
ηb2t ·
[
l(b2, t) · (−2Bη,b2ηb2t ) + 1
]
dt+ l(b2, T )D
η
≥ 2
∫ T
0
Bη,b2(ηb2t )
2 · l(b2, t)dt−
∫ T
0
ηb2t dt.
After rearranging terms, we obtain:
b2
∫ T
0
Bη,b2(ηb2t )
2 ·
(∫ t
0
e−2B
η,b2
∫ t
s
η
b2
u duds
)
dt ≤
∫ T
0
b2η
b2
t dt. (54)
First, consider Jb21 . From equation (44) and inequalities (46) and (53), we have that for all
b2 ≥ b∗,basic2 and for all t ∈ [0, T ]:
b2vt = V ar(ξ)e
2b1t · b2e−2Bη,b2
∫ t
0 ηsds + σ2 · b2
∫ t
0
e2b1(t−s) · e−2Bη,b2
∫ t
s ηududs
≤ V ar(ξ)e2b1T · b2e−
2b2
r+r¯
mη ·t + σ2e2b1T b2 · l(t)
≤ e2b1T
(
V ar(ξ)b2e
−κ3b2t +
σ2
κ3
)
.
Let b∗,J1 ≥ b∗,basic such that for all b2 ≥ b∗,J12 :
(b2 + b¯2)w
b2
0 ≤ cw +
1
2
cw, and b2e
−κ3b2T ≤ 1
κ3
.
Then for all b2 ≥ b∗,J12 :
Jb21 ≤
q + q¯
2
· e2b1T
∫ T
0
(
V ar(ξ)b2e
−κ3b2t +
σ2
κ3
)
dt
+
qT + q¯T
2
· e2b1T
(
V ar(ξ)b2e
−κ3T ·b2 +
σ2
κ3
)
+
b2
2(b2 + b¯2)
(E(ξ))2 · (b2 + b¯2)wb20
≤ (q + q¯)e
2b1T
2
[
V ar(ξ)
κ3
+
σ2T
κ3
]
+
(qT + q¯T )e
2b1T
2
(
V ar(ξ)
κ3
+
σ2
κ3
)
+
3cw(E(ξ))
2
4
=:MJ1 . (55)
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Next, consider the quantity Jb22 , which can be written as:
Jb22 =
1
2(r + r¯)
∫ T
0
(
b2η
b2
t
)2
V ar(ξ)e2b1t · b2 exp
(
−2Bη,b2
∫ t
0
ηsds
)
dt
+
σ2
2
· b2
∫ T
0
Bη,b2(ηb2t )
2
(∫ t
0
e2b1(t−s)−2B
η,b2
∫ t
s
η
b2
u duds
)
dt.
We will make use of Lemma 1, which appears below, and states that there exists a b∗,l2 > 0 and a
constant Ml independent of b2 such that for all b2 ≥ b∗,l2 :∫ T
0
b2η
b2
t dt ≤Ml. (56)
Since limb2→∞ b2η
b2
t = cη for all t ∈ [0, T/2], there exists a b∗,J22 ≥ max{b∗,l2 , b∗,basic2 } such that for
all b2 ≥ b∗,J22 :
b2ηt ≤ cη + 1
2
cη, ∀ t ∈ [0, T/2], and b32e−κ3b2
T
2 ≤ 1
κ3
.
Thus, together with inequalities (46), (47), (54), and (56), and for κ4 :=
V ar(ξ)e2b1T
2(r+r¯) , we deduce
that:
Jb22 ≤
V ar(ξ)e2b1T
2(r + r¯)
[∫ T
2
0
(
b2η
b2
t
)2
b2e
−κ3b2tdt+
∫ T
T
2
(ηb2t )
2b32e
−2Bη,b2
∫ t
0 η
b2
s dsdt
]
+
σ2e2b1T
2
∫ T
0
b2η
b2
t dt
≤ κ4
[(
3cη
2
)2 1
κ3
(1− e−κ3b2 T2 ) +M2 · b32e−κ3b2
T
2 · T
2
]
+
σ2e2b1T
2
Ml
≤ κ4
κ3
(
9
4
c2η +
M2T
2
)
+
σ2e2b1TMl
2
=:MJ2 . (57)
Now, from equation (52) and inequalities (55) and (57), we have for all b2 ≥ b∗,den2 := max{b∗,J12 , b∗,J22 }:
b2SC
MKV,b2 = Jb21 + J
b2
2 ≤MJ1 +MJ2 =:Mden. (58)
Finally, putting together inequalities (51) and (58) and for b∗,case22 := max{b¯2, b∗,num2 , b∗,den2 },
we have for all b2 ≥ b∗,case22 :
b2 + b¯2
b2
≤ 2, and thus, ∆SC
b2
SCMKV,b2
=
(b2 + b¯2)∆SC
b2(
b2+b¯2
b2
)
(b2SCMKV,b2)
≥ cnum
2Mden
> 0.
Therefore, from equation (31), we conclude:
lim
b2→∞
PoAb2 > 1.
The following lemma was used in Proposition 4.
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Lemma 1. Assume Assumption 1. There exists a b∗,l2 > 0 and a M
l > 0, such that for all b2 ≥ b∗,l2 :∫ T
0
b2η
b2
t dt ≤M l.
Proof. Since limb2→∞ b2η
b2
t = cη, there exists a b
∗,1
2 > 0 such that for b2 ≥ b∗,12 , we have b2ηb20 ≤
cη +
1
2 . Clearly there exists a b
∗,2
2 > 0 such that for b2 ≥ b∗,22 :
b2η
b2
T = b2D
η = b2(qT + q¯T ) ≥ cη + 2.
Let b∗,32 such that for b2 ≥ b∗,32 , the function t 7→ b2ηb2t is increasing. Since for b2 ≥ max{b∗,12 , b∗,22 , b∗,32 },
the function t 7→ b2ηb2t is increasing and continuous, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists
a t∗b2 ∈ [0, T ] such that b2ηb2t∗b2 = cη+1, and b2η
b2
t ≤ cη+1, for all t ≤ t∗b2 . From an analogous equation
to (36) for ηb2t∗b2
, we have for b2 ≥ max{b∗,12 , b∗,22 , b∗,32 }:
1 = b2η
b2
t∗b2
− cη ≤
Cη
b2
+Dη
δ
+,b2
η
b2
− Dηr+r¯ cη +
δ
−,b2
η
b22
cη +
(
−Dη δ
−,b2
η
b2
+ D
η
r+r¯ cη
)
e
−(δ
+,b2
η −δ
−,b2
η )(T−t∗b2
)
Dη
r+r¯ −
δ
−,b2
η
b22
− Dηr+r¯e
−(δ
+,b2
η −δ
−,b2
η )(T−t∗b2
)
.
After rearranging terms:
Dη
r + r¯
−
[
δ−,b2η
b22
(1 + cη) +
Cη
b2
+Dη
(
δ+,b2η
b2
− cδη
)]
≤
(
−Dη δ
−,b2
η
b2
+
Dη
r + r¯
(1 + cη)
)
e
−
(
δ
+,b2
η −δ
−,b2
η
)
(T−t∗b2
)
.
(59)
Since we have limb2→∞
δ
−,b2
η
b22
= limb2→∞
Cη
b2
= limb2→∞
(
δ
+,b2
η
b2
− cδη
)
= 0, there exists a b∗,42 > 0
such that for b2 ≥ b∗,42 ,
[
δ
−,b2
η
b22
(1 + cη) +
Cη
b2
+Dη
(
δ
+,b2
η
b2
− cδη
)]
≤ Dη2(r+r¯) , and thus returning to
inequality (59), for b2 ≥ max{b∗,12 , b∗,22 , b∗,32 , b∗,42 }:
Dη
2(r + r¯)
≤
(
−Dη δ
−,b2
η
b2
+
Dη
r + r¯
(1 + cη)
)
e
−
(
δ
+,b2
η −δ
−,b2
η
)
(T−t∗b2
)
.
After rearranging terms:
b2(T − t∗b2) ≤
1(
δ
+,b2
η −δ
−,b2
η
)
b2
ln
(
−2δ
−,b2
η (r + r¯)
b2
+ 2(1 + cη)
)
. (60)
Since limb2→∞
δ
+,b2
η
b2
= cδη = − limb2→∞ δ
−,b2
η
b2
, there exists a b∗,52 > 0 such that for b2 ≥ b∗,52 :
cδη
2
≤ −δ
−,b2
η
b2
≤ 3cδη
2
, and cδη ≤
δ+,b2η − δ−,b2η
b2
≤ 3cδη .
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Returning to inequality (60), for b2 ≥ b∗,l2 := max{b∗,12 , b∗,22 , b∗,32 , b∗,42 , b∗,52 }:
b2(T − t∗b2) ≤
1
cδη
ln
(
3(r + r¯)cδη + 2(1 + cη)
)
=
1
cδη
ln (5cη + 2) .
Finally, for b2 ≥ b∗,l2 :∫ T
0
b2η
b2
t dt =
∫ t∗b2
0
b2η
b2
t dt+
∫ T
t∗b2
b2η
b2
t dt ≤ t∗b2(cη + 1) + b2(T − t∗b2)Dη
≤ T (cη + 1) + D
η
cδη
ln (5cη + 2) =:M
l.
Proposition 5. Assume Assumption 1. If b¯2 = 0, then:
lim
b2→0
PoA = 1,
whereas if b¯2 > 0, then:
lim
b2→0
PoA > 1.
Proof. Case 1: First, consider the case b¯2 = 0. As b2 → 0, we have:
Bb2 → 0, Bη,b2 → 0,
and λ = r+r¯(1−s¯)
2
r+r¯(1−s¯) , (A
u, Cu,Du), (Aw, Cw,Dw), (Aη , Cη,Dη) are all independent of b2. We can then
use the same technique shown in Proposition 3 to conclude that limb2→0 PoA = 1.
Case 2: Now, let’s assume b¯2 > 0. As b2 → 0, we have:
λ −→ 0, Bb2 −→ b¯
2
2
r + r¯(1− s¯)2 =: B
b2→0 > 0, Bη,b2 −→ 0, Cu,b2 −→ 0, Du,b2 −→ 0,
and Au, (Aw, Cw,Dw), (Aη , Cη,Dη) are independent of b2. Moreover, we have:
lim
b2→0
δ+,b2u = −2Au > 0, and lim
b2→0
δ−,b2u = 0.
Thus, from equation (36) we deduce that for every fixed time t ∈ [0, T ], limb2→0 ub2t = 0.
Similar to Proposition 3, we can derive a uniform bound for ub2t over [0, T ] for small b2. Indeed,
for any fixed ǫ > 0 there exists a b∗2 > 0 such that for any b2 ≤ b∗2:
max
{
Bb2 , Cu,b2 ,Du,b2
}
≤ Bb2→∞+ ǫ =: ζ, and thus, |ub2t | ≤
ζ + 2ǫ
√
(Au)2 + ζ2
−2Aue−2T
√
(Au)2+ζ2
, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ].
From equation (43), the assumption E(ξ) 6= 0, and by the bounded convergence theorem, we
derive that for any fixed t ∈ [0, T ]:
lim
b2→0
x¯MFG,b2t = E(ξ)e
(b1+b¯1)t =: x¯MFG,b2→0t 6= 0.
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It can also be shown that
∣∣∣x¯MFG,b2t ∣∣∣ ≤ |E(ξ)|e(b1+b¯1)T for any t ∈ [0, T ] and b2 > 0.
Moreover, since Bb2→0 > 0, Bb2→0Cw > 0, Bb2→0Dw > 0, we have limb2→0w
b2
t =: w
b2→0
t , and
wb2→0t is strictly positive over [0, T ). It is easy to check that w
b2
t is also uniformly bounded over
[0, T ] for small b2. Hence, from equation (41) and the bounded convergence theorem, we deduce:
lim
b2→0
∆SCb2 =
1
2
Bb2→0
∫ T
0
(wb2→0t · x¯MFG,b2→0t )2dt > 0.
Since Bη,b2 → 0, Aη < 0, Cη > 0, and Dη > 0, using the same argument shown in Proposition
3, we deduce that ηb2t is uniformly bounded over [0, T ] for small b2 and for all t ∈ [0, T ]:
lim
b2→0
ηb2t =
(
Dη − C
η
2Aη
)
e−2A
η(T−t) +
Cη
2Aη
=: ηb2→0t .
From equation (44) and the bounded convergence theorem, for all t ∈ [0, T ]:
lim
b2→0
vb2t = V ar(ξ)e
2b1t + σ2
∫ t
0
e2b1(t−s)ds =: vb2→0t > 0,
and thus, 0 < limb2→0 SC
MKV,b2 <∞. We conclude limb2→0 PoAb2 > 1.
Proposition 6. Assuming Assumption 1, then:
lim
b¯2→∞
PoA = 1.
Furthermore, if r+r¯(1−s¯)
2
r+r¯(1−s¯) 6= qT+q¯T (1−sT )
2
qT+q¯T (1−sT )
then:
lim
b¯2→0
PoA > 1.
Proof. Case 1: When b¯2 →∞, we have:
λb¯2 → 0, B b¯2 →∞, Cu,b¯2 → 0, Du,b¯2 → 0,
and Au, (Aw, Cw,Dw), (Aη , Bη, Cη,Dη) are independent of b¯2. Following the same technique used
in Proposition 4, we can show that:
lim
b¯2→∞
δ±,b¯2u√
b2 + b¯2
= ±
√
b2(q + q¯(1− s))
r + r¯(1− s¯) =: ±cδu , limb¯2→∞
δ±,b¯2w
b2 + b¯2
= ±
√
q + q¯(1− s)2
r + r¯(1− s¯)2 =: ±cδw ,
and, for all t ∈ [0, T ):
limb¯2→∞(b2 + b¯2)
3
2ub¯2t = (r + r¯(1− s¯)2)cδu =: cu,
limb¯2→∞(b2 + b¯2)w
b¯2
t = (r + r¯(1− s¯2))cδw =: cw.
Next, we provide a uniform upper bound for ub¯2t over [0, T ] and large b¯2.
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Let ζ1 :=
1
2 min {cδu , cδw}. Then there exists a b¯∗,u2 > 0 such that for all b¯2 ≥ b¯∗,u2 ,
max
{∣∣∣∣∣ δ
+,b¯2
u√
b2 + b¯2
− cδu
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
∣∣∣∣∣ δ
−,b¯2
u√
b2 + b¯2
− (−cδu)
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
∣∣∣∣∣ C
u,b¯2√
b2 + b¯2
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
∣∣∣Du,b¯2∣∣∣ , 1√
b2 + b¯2
}
≤ ζ1.
Then with equation (36), for any t ∈ [0, T ] and b¯2 ≥ b¯∗,u2 ,
∣∣∣ub¯2t ∣∣∣ ≤ C
u,b¯2 +Du,b¯2
(
δ+,b¯2u − δ−,b¯2u
)
−δ−,b¯2u
≤ ζ1 + ζ1(2cδu + 2ζ1)
cδu − ζ1
. (61)
By the same argument for wb2t and together with inequality (61), there exists a b¯
∗,upper
2 ≥ b¯∗,u2 and
M > 0 such that:
max
{∣∣∣ub¯2t ∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣wb¯2t ∣∣∣} ≤M, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], b¯2 ≥ b¯∗,upper2 . (62)
Furthermore, we can get a uniform lower bound for (b2 + b¯2)
3
2ub¯2t .
Denote ζ2 :=
b2(r+r¯(1−s¯)2)(qT+q¯T (1−sT ))
r+r¯(1−s) . Then for all t ∈ [0, T ] and b¯2 ≥ b¯∗,u2 we have:
∣∣∣(b2 + b¯2) 32ub¯2t ∣∣∣ ≥ (b2 + b¯2) 32Du,b¯2δ+,b¯2u
(δ+,b¯2u − δ−,b¯2u ) +B b¯2Du,b¯2
≥ ζ2 (cδu − ζ1)
ζ1 (2cδu + 2ζ1) + ζ2/(r + r¯(1− s¯)2)
=: mu. (63)
Now, we adapt the method used in Proposition 4 to prove limb¯2→∞∆SC
b¯2 = 0. Consider the
two quantities:
I b¯21 :=
1
2
B b¯2
∫ T
2
0
(ub¯2s − wb¯2s )2(x¯MFG,b¯2s )2ds and I b¯22 :=
1
2
B b¯2
∫ T
T
2
(ub¯2s −wb¯2s )2(x¯MFG,b¯2s )2ds.
Fix ǫ > 0. In the following, we will show that ∆SC b¯2 = I b¯21 + I
b¯2
2 ≤ 2ǫ for large b¯2. First,
consider I b¯21 . Let ζ3 := cu/2. Because limb¯2→∞B
b¯2(Du,b¯2)2 + 2AuDu,b¯2 − Cu,b¯2 > 0, from equation
(37), there exists a b¯∗,inc2 ≥ b¯∗,upper2 so that for all b¯2 ≥ b¯∗,inc2 , the functions s 7→ ub¯2s and s 7→ wb¯2s
are increasing, and so that for all s ∈ [0, T/2]:
cu − ζ3 ≤ (b2 + b¯2)
3
2ub¯20 ≤ (b2 + b¯2)
3
2ub¯2s ≤ (b2 + b¯2)
3
2ub¯2T
2
≤ cu + ζ3,∣∣∣(b2 + b¯2)ub¯2s ∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣(b2 + b¯2)ub¯2T
2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ζ3, and ∣∣∣(b2 + b¯2)wb¯2s ∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣(b2 + b¯2)wb¯2T
2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ cw + ζ3.
Thus, for any b¯2 ≥ b¯∗,inc2 we have:
I b¯21 =
E(ξ)2
2(r + r¯(1− s¯)2)
∫ T
2
0
(
(b2 + b¯2)u
b¯2
t − (b2 + b¯2)wb¯2t
)2
e2(b1+b¯1)t · e−
2(b2+b¯2)
1/2
r+r¯(1−s¯)2
∫ t
0 (b2+b¯2)
3/2u
b¯2
s ds
dt
≤ κ1 1√
b2 + b¯2
(
1− e−κ2(b2+b¯2)
1
2
)
−−−−→
b¯2→∞
0,
with κ1 :=
E(ξ)2[ζ23+(cw+ζ3)
2]e2(b1+b¯1)
T
2
2(cu−ζ3)
and κ2 :=
(cu−ζ3)T
r+r¯(1−s¯)2 are independent of b¯2. Therefore, there
exists a b¯∗,I12 ≥ b¯∗,02 such that for b¯2 ≥ b¯∗,I12 , we have I b¯11 ≤ ǫ.
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Now, we consider the quantity I b¯22 . Since u
b¯2
t is positive over [0, T ] and from inequalities (62)
and (63), we know that for all b¯2 ≥ b¯∗,upper2 ≥ b¯∗,u2 and t ∈ [T/2, T ],∣∣∣ub¯2t − wb¯2t ∣∣∣ ≤ 2M, and ∫ t
0
(b2 + b¯2)
3
2ub¯2s ds ≥
T
2
mu.
Thus, similar to inequality (50), there exists a b¯∗,I22 ≥ b¯∗,upper2 such that for all b¯2 ≥ b¯∗,I22 :
I b¯22 ≤ κ3(b2 + b¯2)2e−κ4
√
b2+b¯2 ≤ ǫ,
where κ3 :=
TE(ξ)2e2(b1+b¯1)TM2
r+r¯(1−s¯)2 and κ4 :=
Tmu
r+r¯(1−s¯)2 are independent of b¯2.
Hence, for all b¯2 ≥ b¯∗2 := max{b¯∗,I12 , b¯∗,I22 } we have:
∆SC b¯2 = I b¯21 + I
b¯2
2 ≤ 2ǫ.
Since the proof holds for arbitrary ǫ > 0, we obtain:
lim
b¯2→∞
∆SC b¯2 = 0.
Moreover, recall that ηt and vt are invariant with respect to b¯2 and 0 < vt <∞ for t > 0. Clearly
we also have wb¯20 ≥ 0 and limb¯2→∞wb¯20 = 0. Thus, we obtain: 0 < limb¯2→∞ SCMKV,b¯2 < ∞, and
conclude that:
lim
b¯2→∞
PoAb¯2 = 1.
Case 2: When b¯2 → 0, we have:
λb¯2 → λb¯2→0 := r+r¯(1−s¯)2r+r¯(1−s¯) , B b¯2 →
b22
r+r¯(1−s¯)2 =: B
b¯2→0 > 0,
Cu,b¯2 → λb¯2→0(q + q¯(1− s)) =: Cu,b¯2→0 > 0, Du,b¯2 → λb¯2→0(qT + q¯T (1− sT )) =: Du,b¯2→0 > 0,
and Au, (Aw, Cw,Dw), (Aη , Bη, Cη,Dη) are independent of b¯2. Let u
b¯2→0 : [0, T ] → R be the
solution to the limiting Riccati equation:(
ub¯2→0t
)′ − 2Auub¯2→0t −B b¯2→0(ub¯2→0t )2 + Cu,b¯2→0 = 0, ub¯2→0T = Du,b¯2→0, (64)
which we recall has an explicit solution. It is easy to show directly from the explicit solutions
that for every time t ∈ [0, T ], limb¯2→0 ub¯2t = ub¯2→0t . Next, our goal is to bound ub¯2t uniformly over
t ∈ [0, T ] for small b¯2, following the methodology of the proof of Proposition 3. For any ǫ > 0, there
exists a b¯∗2 > 0 such that max{B b¯2 , Cu,b¯2 ,Du,b¯2} < max{B b¯2→0, Cu,b¯2→0,Du,b¯2→0} + ǫ =: ζ4 for all
b¯2 ≤ b¯∗2. Thus, for all b¯2 ≤ b¯∗2 and for every t ∈ [0, T ]:∣∣∣ub¯2t ∣∣∣ ≤ ζ4 + 2ζ4
√
(Au)2 + ζ24
−2Aue−2T
√
(Au)2+ζ24
.
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Similarly, for every time t ∈ [0, T ], limb¯2→0wb¯2t = wb¯2→0t , and wb¯2 is uniformly bounded over
[0, T ] and small b¯2. From equation (43), the assumption E(ξ) 6= 0, and by the bounded convergence
theorem, we have for every t ∈ [0, T ]:
lim
b¯2→0
x¯MFG,b¯2t = E(ξ)e
∫ t
0
(b1+b¯1−Bb¯2→0u
b¯2→0
s )ds =: x¯MFG,b¯2→0t 6= 0. (65)
Moreover, x¯MFG,b¯2 is uniformly bounded for all b¯2 ≤ b¯∗2 and for all t ∈ [0, T ]. From the non-
negativity of ut, we have:∣∣∣x¯MFG,b¯2t ∣∣∣ ≤ |E(ξ)| e(b1+b¯1)T , ∀t ∈ [0, T ], ∀b¯2 ≤ b¯∗2.
By the assumption r+r¯(1−s¯)
2
r+r¯(1−s¯) 6= qT+q¯T (1−sT )
2
qT+q¯T (1−sT )
, we have Du,b¯2→0 6= Dw, and thus by continuity,
ub¯2→0t 6= wb¯2→0t on a set of positive Lebesgue measure. Thus, by the bounded convergence theorem,
we deduce:
lim
b¯2→0
∆SC b¯2 =
1
2
B b¯2→0
∫ T
0
(
(ub¯2→0t − wb¯2→0t
)2 (
x¯MFG,b¯2→0t
)2
dt > 0. (66)
Meanwhile, ηt does not depend on b¯2, and therefore, the variance vt also does not depend on b¯2.
Clearly 0 < vt < ∞ for t > 0 and 0 ≤ wb¯2→00 < ∞, and thus, 0 < limb¯2→0 SCMKV,b¯2 < ∞. Hence,
we deduce:
lim
b¯2→0
PoAb¯2 > 1.
Remark 6. Consider Assumption 1 and the case when b¯2 tends to zero. We have 0 < SC
MKV,b¯2→0 <
∞, and therefore, limb¯2→0 PoAb¯2 = 1 if and only if limb¯2→0∆SC b¯2 = 0. Since we can pass the limit
as in equation (66), we have an analogous result as Theorem 2 but for the limiting coefficients Au,
Aw, B b¯2→0, Cu,b¯2→0, Cw, Du,b¯2→0, and Dw. Therefore, the assumption in Proposition 4 Case 2,
r+r¯(1−s¯)2
r+r¯(1−s¯) 6= qT+q¯T (1−sT )
2
qT+q¯T (1−sT )
, which is equivalent to Du,b¯2→0 6= Dw, is sufficient, but not necessary, in
order to have limb2→0 PoA
b2 > 1.
Proposition 7. Assuming Assumption 1, then:
lim
b1→∞
PoA = 1 and lim
b¯1→∞
PoA =∞.
Furthermore, if:
b2
b2 + b¯2
· r + r¯(1− s¯)
2
r + r¯(1− s¯) · (qT + q¯T (1− sT )) 6= qT + q¯T (1− sT )
2,
then:
lim
b1→0
PoA > 1 and lim
b¯1→0
PoA > 1.
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Proof. Case 1: Consider b1 →∞. Since limb1→∞Au,b1 = limb1→∞Aw,b1 = −∞ we have:
lim
b1→∞
B(Du)2 + 2Au,b1Du − Cu = lim
b1→∞
B(Dw)2 + 2Aw,b1Dw − Cw = −∞.
Denote gu(b1, t) := B
u
b1
t
b1
and gw(b1, t) := B
w
b1
t
b1
. For all t ∈ [0, T ), we have the limits:
lim
b1→∞
gu(b1, t) = lim
b1→∞
gw(b1, t) = 2. (67)
From equation (37), and together with equation (67), there exists a b∗,upper1 > 0 such that for all
b1 ≥ b∗,upper1 , the functions t 7→ ub1t and t 7→ wb1t are decreasing and such that:
sup
0≤t≤T
{gu(b1, t), gw(b1, t)} ≤ max {gu(b1, 0), gw(b1, 0)} ≤ 3.
Fix ǫ > 0. There exists a b∗,I11 ≥ b∗,upper1 such that for all b1 ≥ b∗,I11 , and for all t ∈ [0, 3T/4],
|gu(b1, t)− gw(b1, t)| = max{gu(b1, t)− gw(b1, t), gw(b1, t)− gu(b1, t)}
≤ max{gu(b1, 0)− gw(b1, 3T/4), gw(b1, 0)− gu(b1, 3T/4)}
≤ ǫ,
and
gw(b1, 0) ≥ 2− 1
3
=
5
3
, gu(b1, t) ≥ gu(b1, 3T/4) ≥ 5
3
.
We adapt the methodology in Proposition 4 and split the interval [0, T ] into two parts: [0, 3T/4]
and [3T/4, T ]. For all b1 ≥ b∗,I11 , similar to inequality (48), we have:
∆SCb1
SCMKV,b1
≤ I
b1
1 + I
b1
2
gw(b1, 0)
,
where
Ib11 = b1
∫ 3
4
T
0
(gu(b1, t)− gw(b1, t))2 e2b¯1t · exp
(
2b1t− 2b1
∫ t
0
gu(b1, s)ds
)
dt
≤ ǫ2e2b¯1· 34T · b1
∫ 3
4
T
0
exp
(
2b1t− 2b1 · 5
3
t
)
dt
= ǫ2e
3b¯1T
2 · 3
4
(1− e−b1T )
≤ κ1ǫ2,
in which κ1 :=
3
4e
3b¯1T
2 , and
Ib12 = b1
∫ T
3
4
T
(gu(b1, t)− gw(b1, t))2 e2b¯1t · exp
(
2b1t− 2b1
∫ t
0
gu(b1, s)ds
)
dt
≤ b1(3 + 3)2e2b¯1T ·
∫ T
3
4
T
exp
(
2b1t− 2b1
∫ 3
4
T
0
gu(b1, s)ds
)
dt
≤ 36e2b¯1T b1 · T
4
exp
(
2b1 · T − 2b1 · 3
4
T · 5
3
)
= 9Te2b¯1T b1e
− 1
2
b1T −−−−→
b1→∞
0.
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Therefore, there exists a b∗1 ≥ b∗,I11 , so that for b1 ≥ b∗1, we have Ib12 ≤ ǫ. Hence, for all b1 ≥ b∗1,
∆SCb1
SCMKV,b1
≤ I
b1
1 + I
b1
2
gw(b1, 0)
≤ 3
5
(κ1ǫ
2 + ǫ).
Since the proof holds for arbitrary ǫ > 0, and κ1 =
3
4e
3b¯1T
2 is independent of b1 and ǫ, we conclude
that:
lim
b1→∞
PoAb1 = 1.
Case 2: Now, consider b¯1 → ∞. Since Au,b¯1 < 0 and limb¯1→∞ |Au,b¯1 | = ∞, we have the
following limits:
δ+,b¯1u − δ−,b¯1u = 2
√
(Au,b¯1)2 +BCu −−−−→
b¯1→∞
∞, −δ−,b¯1u = Au,b¯1 +
√
(Au,b¯1)2 +BCu −−−−→
b¯1→∞
0,
δ+,b¯1u
b¯1
=
b1 +
b¯1
2
b¯1
+
√(
b1 +
b¯1
2
)2
+BCu
b¯1
−−−−→
b¯1→∞
1
2
+
1
2
= 1.
We also have for t ∈ [0, T ):
δ+,b¯1u e
−(δ
+,b¯1
u −δ
−,b¯1
u )(T−t) ≤ (δ+,b¯1u − δ−,b¯1u )e−(δ
+,b¯1
u −δ
−,b¯1
u )(T−t) −−−−→
b¯1→∞
0,
which implies: limb¯1→∞ δ
+,b¯1
u e−(δ
+,b¯1
u −δ
−,b¯1
u )(T−t) = 0. Therefore, for t ∈ [0, T ): limb¯1→∞
u
b¯1
t
b¯1
= 1B .
By the same argument, we have for t ∈ [0, T ): limb¯1→∞
w
b¯1
t
b¯1
= 2B .
Since limb¯1→∞B(D
u)2+2Au,b¯1Du−Cu = −∞ and limb¯1→∞B(Dw)2+2Aw,b¯1Dw −Cw = −∞,
from equation (37) there exists a b¯∗,lower1 such that for b¯1 ≥ b¯∗,lower1 :
max


∣∣∣∣∣u
b¯1
0
b¯1
− 1
B
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
∣∣∣∣∣∣
wb¯1T/2
b¯1
− 2
B
∣∣∣∣∣∣

 ≤ 14B ,
and such that the functions t 7→ ub¯1t and t 7→ wb¯1t are decreasing. Thus, for all t ∈ [0, T/2] we have:
0 <
ub¯1t
b¯1
≤ u
b¯1
0
b¯1
≤ 1
B
+
1
4B
≤ 2
B
− 1
4B
≤
wb¯1T/2
b¯1
≤ w
b¯1
t
b¯1
.
Thus, for all b¯1 ≥ b¯∗,lower1 and all t ∈ [0, T/2],∣∣∣∣∣w
b¯1
t
b¯1
− u
b¯1
t
b¯1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 12B . (68)
Note that ηt, and therefore, vt, are independent of b¯1. Thus,
1
b¯21
SCMKV,b¯1 =
1
2b¯21
[∫ T
0
[
q + q¯ +Bηη2t
]
vtdt+ (qT + q¯T )vT
]
+
wb¯10
2b¯21
(E(ξ))2 −−−−→
b¯1→∞
0.
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Now, consider:
1
b¯21
∆SC b¯1 ≥ B
2
(E(ξ))2
∫ T
2
0
(
ub¯1t
b¯1
− w
b¯1
t
b¯1
)2
e2
∫ t
0 (b1+b¯1−Bu
b¯1
s )dsdt. (69)
Since ub¯1t is decreasing for b¯1 ≥ b¯∗,lower1 , we have b¯1 − Bub¯1t ≥ b¯1 − Bub¯10 . We have the following
limits for t ∈ [0, T ):
lim
b¯1→∞
b¯1 − δ+,b¯1u = −2b1, lim
b¯1→∞
−δ−,b¯1u b¯1 = BCu,
lim
b¯1→∞
δ+,b¯1u b¯1e
−(δ
+,b¯1
u −δ
−,b¯1
u )(T−t) = 0, lim
b¯1→∞
(δ−,b¯1u − b¯1)e−(δ
+,b¯1
u −δ
−,b¯1
u )(T−t) = 0,
and thus,
b¯1 −Bub¯10 =
−BCu +BDu(b¯1 − δ+,b¯1u )− δ−,b¯1u b¯1 + (δ+,b¯1u b¯1 +BCu +BDu(δ−,b¯1u − b¯1))e−(δ
+,b¯1
u −δ
−,b¯1
u )T
BDu − δ−,b¯1u + (δ+,b¯1u −BDu)e−(δ+,b¯1u −δ−,b¯1u )T
−−−−→
b¯1→∞
−2b1.
Since limb¯1→∞(b¯1 − Bub¯10 ) = −2b1 < 0, there exists a b¯∗1 ≥ b¯∗,lower1 , such that for b¯1 ≥ b¯∗1, (b¯1 −
Bub¯10 ) ≥ −3b1. Returning to inequality (69), and using inequality (68) we have for b¯1 ≥ b¯∗1:
1
b¯21
∆SC b¯1 ≥ B
2
E(ξ)2 · 1
4B2
·
∫ T
2
0
e2b1t+2(b¯1−Bu
b¯1
0 )tdt ≥ E(ξ)
2
8B
∫ T
2
0
e−4b1tdt > 0.
Therefore, limb¯1→∞
1
b¯21
∆SC b¯1 > 0, and thus,
lim
b¯1→∞
∆SC b¯1
SCMKV,b¯1
= lim
b¯1→∞
1
b¯21
∆SC b¯1
1
b¯21
SCMKV,b¯1
=∞.
We conclude limb¯1→∞ PoA
b¯1 =∞.
Cases 3 and 4: First, we consider b1 → 0. We have Au,b1 → Au,b1→0, δ+,b1u → δ+,b1→0u > 0,
and δ−,b1u → δ−,b1→0u < 0, and similarly for Aw,b1 , Aη,b1 , δ±,b1w , and δ±,b1η . Clearly we have for all
t ∈ [0, T ], limb1→0 ub1t =: ub1→0t , limb1→0wb1t =: wb1→0t , and limb1→0 ηb1t =: ηb1→0t . Next, we show
that the three sequences are uniformly bounded. Let 0 < ǫ < −δ−,b1→0u . There exists a b∗1 > 0
such that max
{∣∣∣δ+,b1u − δ+,b1→0u ∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣δ−,b1u − δ−,b1→0u ∣∣∣} < ǫ for all b1 ≤ b∗1. Then for all b1 ≤ b∗1 and
t ∈ [0, T ]:
∣∣∣ub1t ∣∣∣ ≤ C
u +Du
(
δ+,b1u − δ−,b1u
)
−δ−,b1u
≤
Cu +Du
(
δ+,b1→0u − δ−,b1→0u + 2ǫ
)
−δ−,b1→0u − ǫ
,
and similarly for
∣∣∣wb1t ∣∣∣ and ∣∣∣ηb1t ∣∣∣. From the assumption b2b2+b¯2 · r+r¯(1−s¯)2r+r¯(1−s¯) · qT + q¯T (1 − sT ) 6= qT +
q¯T (1−sT )2, we have Du 6= Dw and thus by continuity, ub1→0t 6= wb1→0t on a set of positive Lebesgue
measure.
31
From equation (43), the assumption E(ξ) 6= 0, and by the bounded convergence theorem, we
have for every t ∈ [0, T ]:
lim
b1→0
x¯MFG,b1t = E(ξ)e
∫ t
0 (b¯1−Bu
b1→0
s )ds =: x¯MFG,b1→0t 6= 0.
Moreover, x¯MFG,b1t is uniformly bounded over b1 ≤ b∗1 and t ∈ [0, T ], i.e.∣∣∣x¯MFG,b1t ∣∣∣ ≤ |E(ξ)| eb¯1T , ∀t ∈ [0, T ], b1 ≤ b∗1.
Therefore, by the bounded convergence theorem, 0 < limb1→0∆SC
b1 < ∞ and limb1→0 vb1t =:
vb1→0t , which is bounded over t ∈ [0, T ]. Thus, 0 < limb1→0 SCMKV,b1 < ∞ and we conclude
limb1→0 PoA
b1 > 1. The proof can be repeated to show limb¯1→0 PoA
b¯1 > 1.
2.4 Numerical Results
The price of anarchy for the class of linear quadratic extended mean field games that we consider
is given by the ratio of the two quantities given by equations (25) and (26), which are explicit,
up to evaluating integrals. Using the simple rectangle rule to estimate integrals, we numerically
compute the price of anarchy when the coefficients are time-independent, non-negative, and satisfy
Assumption 1. In particular, when we allow for full interaction (i.e. through the states and the
controls), we choose the following default values:
ξ ≡ 1, T = 1, b1 = 1, b¯1 = 1, b2 = 1, b¯2 = 1, σ = 1,
q = 1, q¯ = 1, s = 0.5, r = 1, r¯ = 1, s¯ = 0.5, qT = 1, q¯T = 1, sT = 0.5.
Unless otherwise stated, the parameters stay at these default values. For results involving only
interaction through the states, we set b¯2 = 0 and r¯ = 0. For results involving only interaction
through the controls, we set b¯1 = 0, q¯ = 0, and q¯T = 0. Figures 1-5 show the price of anarchy as
we vary one parameter at a time for each of three interaction cases: full interaction (i.e. through
the states and the controls), interaction only through the states, and interaction only through the
controls. The results show various limiting behaviors, such as some of the cases proved in the
previous section.
Figure 1 confirms as in Proposition 3 that limr→∞ PoA = 1 and limr¯→∞ PoA = 1. Propositions
4 and 5 are confirmed in Figure 2. In the case of full interaction, we have q+q¯(1−s)r+r¯(1−s¯) =
q+q¯(1−s)2
r+r¯(1−s¯)2 and
we see that limb2→∞ PoA = 1. In the cases of interaction only through the states or interaction
only through the controls, then q+q¯(1−s)r+r¯(1−s¯) 6= q+q¯(1−s)
2
r+r¯(1−s¯)2 , and we see that limb2→∞ PoA > 1, confirming
Proposition 4. For Proposition 5, when there is only interaction through the states, then b¯2 = 0
and we see that limb2→0 PoA = 1. When there is full interaction or only interaction through the
controls, then b¯2 > 0 and we see that limb2→0 PoA > 1. For Proposition 6, Figure 3 confirms that
limb¯2→0 PoA > 1 and limb¯2→∞ PoA = 1. Note that the condition
r+r¯(1−s¯)2
r+r¯(1−s¯) 6= qT+q¯T (1−sT )
2
qT+q¯T (1−sT )
is not
satisfied for the full interaction case, and is therefore a sufficient, but not necessary, assumption.
This agrees with the conclusion of Remark 6. In Figures 4 and 5, we note that Proposition 7 is
confirmed. The condition b2
b2+b¯2
· r+r¯(1−s¯)2r+r¯(1−s¯) · (qT + q¯T (1− sT )) 6= qT + q¯T (1− sT )2 is satisfied for all
three interaction cases and we see that limb1→0 PoA > 1, limb¯1→0 PoA > 1, limb1→∞ PoA = 1, and
limb¯1→∞ PoA =∞. Thus, the numerical computations confirm the results presented in Propositions
3-7.
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Figure 1: PoA as we vary r (left) and r¯ (right).
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Figure 2: PoA as we vary b2.
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Figure 3: PoA as we vary b¯2.
3 Conclusion
We defined the price of anarchy (PoA) in the context of extended mean field games as the ratio of
the worst case social cost when the players are in a mean field game equilibrium to the social cost
as computed by a central planner. Since the central planner does not require that the players be in
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Figure 4: PoA as we vary b1.
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Figure 5: PoA as we vary b¯1.
a mean field game equilibrium, the central planner will realize a social cost that is no worse than
that of a mean field game equilibrium. Thus, PoA ≥ 1.
We computed the price of anarchy for linear quadratic extended mean field games, for which
explicit computations are possible. We identify a large class of models for which PoA = 1 (see
Proposition 1 and Corollaries 1 and 2), as well as giving a sufficient and necessary condition to have
PoA = 1 (see Theorem 2 and Corollary 3). We also derive some limiting cases where PoA → 1
as certain parameters tend to zero or to infinity (see Propositions 3-7). The numerics support our
theoretical results.
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Appendices
A Solving Linear FBSDEs of McKean-Vlasov Type
Consider a linear FBSDE system of McKean-Vlasov type:
dXt =
(
axtXt + a
x¯
t EXt + a
y
tYt + a
y¯
tEYt
)
dt+ σdWt, X0 = ξ,
dYt =
(
bxtXt + b
x¯
t EXt + b
y
tYt + b
y¯
tEYt
)
dt+ ZtdWt, YT = c
xXT + c
x¯
EXT .
(70)
For the LQEMFG model considered in section 2.1, the FBSDE system in equation (4) is of the
form of equation (70) if we set:
axt = b1(t), a
x¯
t = b¯1(t), a
y
t = a
MFG(t)b2(t), a
y¯
t = b
MFG(t)b2(t) + c
MFG(t)b¯2(t)
bxt = −(q(t) + q¯(t)), bx¯t = q¯(t)s(t), byt = −b1(t), by¯t = 0
cxt = qT + q¯T , c
x¯
t = −q¯T sT .
For the LQEMKV model considered in section 2.2, the FBSDE system in equation (12) is of the
form of equation (70) if we set:
axt = b1(t), a
x¯
t = b¯1(t), a
y
t = a
MKV (t)b2(t), a
y¯
t = b
MKV (t)b2(t) + c
MKV (t)b¯2(t)
bxt = −(q(t) + q¯(t)), bx¯t = −s(t)q¯(t)(s(t)− 2), byt = −b1(t), by¯t = −b¯1
cxt = qT + q¯T , c
x¯
t = sT q¯T (sT − 2).
Now we return to the general FBSDE system (70). By taking expectations in equation (70),
and letting x¯t and y¯t denote EXt and EYt, respectively, we get:
˙¯xt = (a
x
t + a
x¯
t )x¯t + (a
y
t + a
y¯
t )y¯t, x¯0 = E(ξ),
˙¯yt = (b
x
t + b
x¯
t )x¯t + (b
y
t + b
y¯
t )y¯t, y¯T = (c
x + cx¯)x¯T ,
(71)
where the dot is the standard ODE notation for a derivative. We then make the ansatz y¯t = η¯tx¯t+χ¯t
for deterministic functions [0, T ] ∋ t 7→ η¯t ∈ R and [0, T ] ∋ t 7→ χ¯t ∈ R. By plugging in the ansatz,
the system in equation (71) is equivalent to the ODE system:
˙¯ηt + (a
y
t + a
y¯
t )η¯
2
t + (a
x
t + a
x¯
t − byt − by¯t )η¯t − bxt − bx¯t = 0, η¯T = cx + cx¯,
˙¯χt + (η¯t(a
y
t + a
y¯
t )− byt − by¯t )χ¯t = 0, χ¯T = 0.
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The first equation is a Riccati equation. Note that χ¯t solves a first order homogeneous linear
equation. Thus χ¯t = 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. Once the equation for η¯t is solved, we can compute x¯t by
solving the linear ODE:
˙¯xt = (a
x
t + a
x¯
t + (a
y
t + a
y¯
t )η¯t)x¯t, x¯0 = E(ξ),
and thus,
x¯t = E(ξ)e
∫ t
0
(axu+a
x¯
u+(a
y
u+a
y¯
u)η¯u)du.
Once we have computed (x¯t)0≤t≤T , we can rewrite the original FBSDE system:
dXt =
(
axtXt + a
y
t Yt + a
0
t
)
dt+ σdWt, X0 = ξ,
dYt =
(
bxtXt + b
y
tYt + b
0
t
)
dt+ ZtdWt, YT = c
xXT + c
0,
with:
a0t = (a
x¯
t + a
y¯
t η¯t)x¯t, b
0
t = (b
x¯
t + b
y¯
t η¯t)x¯t, c
0 = cx¯x¯T .
Now we make the ansatz: Yt = ηtXt + χt, which reduces the problem to the ODE system:
η˙t + a
y
t η
2
t + (a
x
t − byt )ηt − bxt = 0, ηT = cx,
χ˙t + (−byt + ayt ηt)χt + a0t ηt − b0t = 0, χT = c0,
Zt = σηt.
Again, the first equation is a Riccati equation. Note that it is not necessary to solve for χt because
of the relationship:
η¯tx¯t = y¯t = E(Yt) = E(ηtXt + χt) = ηtx¯t + χt.
Thus, χt = (η¯t − ηt)x¯t.
In summary, the solution to the linear FBSDE of McKean-Vlasov type is reduced to solving
linear ODEs and Riccati equations. It will also be useful to compute V ar(Xt), which we denote by
vt. After we have solved the above equations, we have:
dXt =
(
(axt + a
y
t ηt)Xt + a
y
tχt + a
0
t
)
dt+ σdWt, X0 = ξ.
Thus,
vt = V ar(Xt) = V ar(ξ)e
∫ t
0 2(a
x
s+a
y
sηs)ds + σ2
∫ t
0
e2
∫ t
s (a
x
u+a
y
uηu)duds.
In the case where the coefficients are time-independent, the Riccati equations for η¯t and ηt can be
solved explicitly.
Scalar Riccati Equation
If the scalar Riccati equation:
ρ˙t −Bρ2t − 2Aρt + C = 0,
with terminal condition ρT = D satisfies:
B 6= 0, BD ≥ 0, BC > 0, (72)
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then it has a unique solution:
ρt =
C(1− e−(δ+−δ−)(T−t)) +D(δ+ − δ−e−(δ+−δ−)(T−t))
BD(1− e−(δ+−δ−)(T−t)) + δ+e−(δ+−δ−)(T−t) − δ− , (73)
with δ± = −A±√(A)2 +BC.
Furthermore, if B → 0 and A 6= 0, we can deduce that the limiting solution of the scalar Riccati
equation coincides with the linear first-order differential equation:
ρ˙t − 2Aρt + C = 0,
with terminal condition ρT = D, namely:
ρt =
(
D − C
2A
)
e−2A(T−t) +
C
2A
.
If B → 0 and A = 0, the limiting solution of the scalar Riccati equation coincides with the
linear first-order differential equation:
ρ˙t + C = 0
with terminal condition ρT = D, namely:
ρt = D + C(T − t).
Hence, returning to the linear FBSDE (70), for η¯t, we use:
A = −12(ax + ax¯ − by − by¯), , B = −(ay + ay¯), C = −(bx + bx¯), D = cx + cx¯.
The conditions (72) are satisfied if −(ay + ay¯) > 0, −(bx + bx¯) > 0, and cx + cx¯ ≥ 0.
For ηt, we use:
A = −12(ax − by), B = −ay, C = −bx, D = cx.
The conditions (72) are satisfied if −ay > 0, −bx > 0, and cx ≥ 0. Returning to the LGEMFG and
LGEMKV problems, if we assume the coefficients are non-negative, we see that these conditions
are exactly assumption (21).
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